[199a]
in the operations of war; whence the law ordains that the general shall give orders to the seer, and not the seer to the general. May we say this, Laches?Laches
We may.Socrates
Well now, do you agree with us, Nicias, that the same knowledge has comprehension of the same things, whether future, present, or past?Nicias
I do, for that is my own opinion, Socrates.Socrates
And courage, my good friend, is knowledge of [199b] what is to be dreaded and dared, as you say, do you not?Nicias
Yes.Socrates
And things to be dreaded and things to be dared have been admitted to be either future goods or future evils?Nicias
Certainly.Socrates
And the same knowledge is concerned with the same things, whether in the future or in any particular stage?Nicias
That is so.Socrates
Then courage is knowledge not merely of what is to be dreaded and what dared, for it comprehends goods and evils not merely in the future, but also in the present [199c] and the past and in any stage, like the other kinds of knowledge.Nicias
Apparently.Socrates
So the answer that you gave us, Nicias, covers only about a third part of courage; whereas our question was of what courage is as a whole. And now it appears, on your own showing, that courage is knowledge not merely of what is to be dreaded and what dared, but practically a knowledge concerning all goods and evils at every stage; [199d] such is your present account of what courage must be. What do you say to this new version, Nicias?Nicias
I accept it, Socrates.Socrates
Now do you think, my excellent friend, there could be anything wanting to the virtue of a man who knew all good things, and all about their production in the present, the future, and the past, and all about evil things likewise? Do you suppose that such a man could be lacking in temperance, or justice, and holiness, when he alone has the gift of taking due precaution, in his dealings with gods and men, [199e] as regards what is to be dreaded and what is not, and of procuring good things, owing to his knowledge of the right behaviour towards them?Nicias
I think, Socrates, there is something in what you say.Socrates
Hence what you now describe, Nicias, will be not a part but the whole of virtue.Nicias
Apparently.Socrates
But, you know, we said that courage is one of the parts of virtue.Nicias
Yes, we did.Socrates
And what we now describe is seen to be different.Nicias
So it seems.Socrates
Thus we have failed to discover, Nicias, what courage really is.Nicias
Evidently.Laches
And I, in fact, supposed, my dear Nicias, that you were going to discover it,
We may.Socrates
Well now, do you agree with us, Nicias, that the same knowledge has comprehension of the same things, whether future, present, or past?Nicias
I do, for that is my own opinion, Socrates.Socrates
And courage, my good friend, is knowledge of [199b] what is to be dreaded and dared, as you say, do you not?Nicias
Yes.Socrates
And things to be dreaded and things to be dared have been admitted to be either future goods or future evils?Nicias
Certainly.Socrates
And the same knowledge is concerned with the same things, whether in the future or in any particular stage?Nicias
That is so.Socrates
Then courage is knowledge not merely of what is to be dreaded and what dared, for it comprehends goods and evils not merely in the future, but also in the present [199c] and the past and in any stage, like the other kinds of knowledge.Nicias
Apparently.Socrates
So the answer that you gave us, Nicias, covers only about a third part of courage; whereas our question was of what courage is as a whole. And now it appears, on your own showing, that courage is knowledge not merely of what is to be dreaded and what dared, but practically a knowledge concerning all goods and evils at every stage; [199d] such is your present account of what courage must be. What do you say to this new version, Nicias?Nicias
I accept it, Socrates.Socrates
Now do you think, my excellent friend, there could be anything wanting to the virtue of a man who knew all good things, and all about their production in the present, the future, and the past, and all about evil things likewise? Do you suppose that such a man could be lacking in temperance, or justice, and holiness, when he alone has the gift of taking due precaution, in his dealings with gods and men, [199e] as regards what is to be dreaded and what is not, and of procuring good things, owing to his knowledge of the right behaviour towards them?Nicias
I think, Socrates, there is something in what you say.Socrates
Hence what you now describe, Nicias, will be not a part but the whole of virtue.Nicias
Apparently.Socrates
But, you know, we said that courage is one of the parts of virtue.Nicias
Yes, we did.Socrates
And what we now describe is seen to be different.Nicias
So it seems.Socrates
Thus we have failed to discover, Nicias, what courage really is.Nicias
Evidently.Laches
And I, in fact, supposed, my dear Nicias, that you were going to discover it,
