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[254a] he also is hard to see clearly, but the difficulty is not the same in his case and that of the sophist.

Theaetetus
How do they differ?

Stranger
The sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being, feeling his way in it by practice,1 and is hard to discern on account of the darkness of the place. Don't you think so?

Theaetetus
It seems likely.

Stranger
But the philosopher, always devoting himself through reason to the idea of being, is also very difficult to see on account of the brilliant light of the place; for the eyes [254b] of the soul of the multitude are not strong enough to endure the sight of the divine.

Theaetetus
This also seems no less true than what you said about the sophist.

Stranger
Now we will make more accurate investigations about the philosopher hereafter, if we still care to do so; but as to the sophist, it is clear that we must not relax our efforts until we have a satisfactory view of him.

Theaetetus
You are right.

Stranger
Since, therefore, we are agreed that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not, and some will mingle with few and others with many, and that [254c] there is nothing to hinder some from mingling universally with all, let us next proceed with our discussion by investigating, not all the forms or ideas, lest we become confused among so many, but some only, selecting them from those that are considered the most important; let us first consider their several natures, then what their power of mingling with one another is, and so, if we cannot grasp being and not-being with perfect clearness, we shall at any rate not fail to reason fully about them, so far as the method of our present inquiry permits. Let us in this way see whether it is, after all, [254d] permitted us to say that not-being really is, although not being, and yet come off unscathed.

Theaetetus
Yes; that is the proper thing for us to do.

Stranger
The most important, surely, of the classes or genera are those which we just mentioned; being itself and rest and motion.

Theaetetus
Yes, by far.

Stranger
And further, two of them, we say, cannot mingle with each other.

Theaetetus
Decidedly not.

Stranger
But being can mingle with both of them, for they both are.

Theaetetus
Of course.

Stranger
Then these prove to be three.

Theaetetus
To be sure.

Stranger
Each of them is, then, other than the remaining two, but the same as itself. [254e]

Theaetetus
Yes.

Stranger
But what do we mean by these words, “the same” and “other,” which we have just used? Are they two new classes, different from the other three, but always of necessity mingled with them, and must we conduct our inquiry on the assumption that there are five classes, not three, or are we unconsciously speaking of one of those three


1 By practice, i.e., by empirical knowledge as opposed to reason.

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