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[201a] but if we stay still, we shall discover nothing.

Theaetetus
You are right; let us go on with our investigation.

Socrates
Well, then, this at least calls for slight investigation; for you have a whole profession which declares that true opinion is not knowledge.

Theaetetus
How so? What profession is it?

Socrates
The profession of those who are greatest in wisdom, who are called orators and lawyers; for they persuade men by the art which they possess, not teaching them, but making them have whatever opinion they like. Or do you think there are any teachers so clever as to be able, in the short time allowed by the water-clock,1 [201b] satisfactorily to teach the judges the truth about what happened to people who have been robbed of their money or have suffered other acts of violence, when there were no eyewitnesses?

Theaetetus
I certainly do not think so; but I think they can persuade them.

Socrates
And persuading them is making them have an opinion, is it not?

Theaetetus
Of course.

Socrates
Then when judges are justly persuaded about matters which one can know only by having seen them and in no other way, in such a case, judging of them from hearsay, having acquired a true opinion of them, [201c] they have judged without knowledge, though they are rightly persuaded, if the judgement they have passed is correct, have they not?

Theaetetus
Certainly.

Socrates
But, my friend, if true opinion and knowledge were the same thing in law courts, the best of judges could never have true opinion without knowledge; in fact, however, it appears that the two are different.

Theaetetus
Oh yes, I remember now, Socrates, having heard someone make the distinction, but I had forgotten it. He said that knowledge was true opinion accompanied by reason, [201d] but that unreasoning true opinion was outside of the sphere of knowledge; and matters of which there is not a rational explanation are unknowable—yes, that is what he called them—and those of which there is are knowable.

Socrates
I am glad you mentioned that. But tell us how he distinguished between the knowable and the unknowable, that we may see whether the accounts that you and I have heard agree.

Theaetetus
But I do not know whether I can think it out; but if someone else were to make the statement of it, I think I could follow.

Socrates
Listen then, while I relate it to you—“a dream for a dream.” I in turn [201e] used to imagine that I heard certain persons say that the primary elements of which we and all else are composed admit of no rational explanation; for each alone by itself can only be named, and no qualification can be added, neither that it is nor that it is not,


1 The length of speeches in the Athenian law courts was limited by a water-clock.

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