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We have already said that we ought to transfer our
judgment to action, and not to suffer our words to remain
bare and naked words, but to reduce them to deeds; and
that this is the chiefest sign of a proficient. Now another
manifest indication is a desire of those things we commend,
and a readiness to perform those things which we admire,
but whatsoever we discommend, neither to will or endure
it. It is probable that all the Athenians highly extolled
[p. 471]
the courage and valor of Miltiades. But Themistocles
(who professed that the trophies of Miltiades broke his
sleep, and often forced him out of his bed) did not only
praise and admire what he had done, but was manifestly
struck with a zeal and emulation of his performances.
Therefore we may be assured that we have profited little,
while we think it a vanity to admire those that have done
well, and cannot possibly be raised to an imitation of
them.
To love the person of any man is not sufficient, except
it have a mixture of emulation; no more is that love of
virtue ardent and exciting, which does not put us forward,
and create in our breasts (instead of envy to them) a zealous affection for all good men, and a desire of equal perfection with them. For it is not enough (as Alcibiades
was wont to say) that the heart should be turned upside
down by hearing the discourses of a philosopher, and that
the tears should gush from the eyes; but he that is a proficient indeed, comparing himself with the designs and
actions of a good perfect man, is pricked at the same with
the consciousness of his own weakness, and transported
with hope and desire, and big with irresistible assurance;
and indeed such a one is (as Simonides says) like a little
sucking foal running by the mother's side, and desires to
be incorporated into the very same nature with a good
man. For this is an especial sign of true proficiency, to
love and affect their way of life whose actions we emulate,
and, upon account of an honorable opinion we always entertain for them, to do as they do. But whosoever he is
that entertains a contentious or malicious design against
his betters, let him be assured that he is possessed with a
greedy desire of honor or greatness, but has neither a
true respect nor admiration for virtue.
Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals. Translated from the Greek by several hands. Corrected and revised by. William W. Goodwin, PH. D. Boston. Little, Brown, and Company. Cambridge. Press Of John Wilson and son. 1874. 2.
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