36.
'Some one may think that the course which we recommend is expedient, but he may
be1 afraid that if he is convinced by our arguments he will break the treaty. To
him we reply, that as long as he is strong he may make a present of his fears to the
enemy, but that if he reject the alliance he will be weak, and then his confidence,
however reassuring to himself, will be anything but terrifying to enemies who are
strong.
It is Athens about which he is advising, and not Corcyra: will he be providing for
her best interests if, when war is imminent and almost at the door, he is so anxious
about the chances of the hour that he hesitates to attach to him a state which
cannot be made a friend or enemy without momentous consequences?
[2]
Corcyra, besides offering many other advantages, is conveniently
situated for the coast voyage to Italy and Sicily; it stands in the way of any fleet
coming from thence to the Peloponnesus, and can also protect a fleet on its way to
Sicily.
[3]
One word more, which is the sum of all and everything we have to say, and should
convince you that you must not abandon us.
Hellas has only three considerable navies:—there is ours, and there is
yours, and there is the Corinthian.
Now, if the Corinthians get hold of ours, and you allow the two to become one, you
will have to fight against the united navies of Corcyra and the Peloponnesus.
But, if you make us your allies, you will have our navy in addition to your own
ranged at your side in the impending conflict.'
[4]
Thus spoke the Corcyraeans:
the Corinthians replied as follows:—
1 They cannot afford to be scrupulous; Corcyra is on the way to Sicily; and is one of the three great maritime powers of Hellas.
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