[24]
[It is a false definition if you say,
βA horse is a rational animal,β for though the horse
is an animal, it is irrational. Again, a thing which
is common to something else cannot be a property
of the thing defined.] In the case under discussion,
then, the accused alleges that the definition given
by the accuser is false, whereas the accuser cannot
do the same by his opponent's definition, since to
steal a sacred object is undoubtedly sacrilege. He
therefore alleges that the definition is too narrow
and requires the addition of the words βor from a
sacred place.β
Quintilian. With An English Translation. Harold Edgeworth Butler. Cambridge. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann, Ltd. 1922.
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