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1.
1. To begin with it may be noted that the division laid down by Aristotle1 has met with almost
universal approval. It is to the effect that there are
some proofs adopted by the orator which lie outside
the art of speaking, and others which he himself
deduces or, if I may use the term, begets out of his
case. The former therefore have been styled ἄτεχνοι
or inartificial proofs, the latter ἔντεχνοι or artificial.
[2]
To the first class belong decisions of previous courts,
rumours, evidence extracted by torture, documents,
oaths, and witnesses, for it is with these that the
majority of forensic arguments are concerned. But
though in themselves they involve no art, all the
powers of eloquence are as a rule required to disparage
or refute them. Consequently in my opinion those
who would eliminate the whole of this class of proof
from their rules of oratory, deserve the strongest
condemnation.
[3]
It is not, however, my intention to
embrace all that can be said for or against these views.
I do not for instance propose to lay down rules for
commonplaces, a task requiring infinite detail, but
merely to sketch out the general lines and method
[p. 159]
to be followed by the orator. The method once
indicated, it is for the individual orator not merely to
employ his powers on its application, but on the
invention of similar methods as the circumstances of
the case may demand. For it is impossible to deal
with every kind of case, even if we confine ourselves
to those which have actually occurred in the past
without considering those which may occur in the
future.
1 Rhet. i. ii. 2.
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