[40]
In saying this I do not mean that we should
be ready under any circumstances to defend our
father, brother or friend when in peril (since I
hold that we should be guided by stricter rules in
such matters), although such contingencies may
well cause us no little perplexity, when we have to
decide between the rival claims of justice and natural
[p. 379]
affection. But let us put the problem beyond all
question of doubt. Suppose a man to have plotted
against a tyrant and to be accused of having done so.
Which of the two will the orator, as defined by us,
desire to save? And if he undertakes the defence
of the accused, will he not employ falsehood with
no less readiness than the advocate who is defending
a bad case before a jury?
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