1. The orator then, whom I am concerned to form,
shall be the orator as defined by Marcus Cato, “a good
man, skilled in speaking.”
1 But above all he must
possess the quality which Cato places first and which
is in the very nature of things the greatest and most
important, that is, he must be a good man. This is
essential not merely on account of the fact that, if
the powers of eloquence serve only to lend arms to
crime, there can be nothing more pernicious than
[p. 357]
eloquence to public and private welfare alike, while
I myself, who have laboured to the best of my ability
to contribute something of value to oratory, shall have
rendered the worst of services to mankind, if I forge
these weapons not for a soldier, but for a robber.
But why speak of myself?
[
2]
Nature herself will have
proved not a mother, but a stepmother with regard
to what we deem her greatest gift to man, the gift
that distinguishes us from other living things, if she
devised the power of speech to be the accomplice of
crime, the foe to innocency and the enemy of truth.
For it had been better for men to be born dumb and
devoid of reason than to turn the gifts of providence
to their mutual destruction.
[
3]
But this conviction of
mine goes further. For I do not merely assert that
the ideal orator should be a good man, but I affirm
that no man can be an orator unless he is a good man.
For it is impossible to regard those men as gifted
with intelligence who on being offered the choice
between the two paths of virtue and of vice choose
the latter, nor can we allow them prudence, when
by the unforeseen issue of their own actions they
render themselves liable not merely to the heaviest
penalties of the laws, but to the inevitable torment
of an evil conscience.
[
4]
But if the view that a bad
man is necessarily a fool is not merely held by philosolphers, but is the universal belief of ordinary men,
the fool will most assuredly never become an orator.
To this must be added the fact that the mind will
not find leisure even for the study of the noblest of
tasks, unless it first be free from vice. The reasons for
this are, first, that vileness and virtue cannot jointly
inhabit in the selfsame heart and that it is as impossible for one and the same mind to harbour good
[p. 359]
and evil thoughts as it is for one man to be at once
both good and evil:
[
5]
and secondly, that if the intelligence is to be concentrated on such a vast subject as
eloquence it must be free from all other distractions,
among which must be included even those preoccupations which are free from blame. For it is only
when it is free and self-possessed, with nothing to
divert it or lure it elsewhere, that it will fix its
attention solely on that goal, the attainment of which
is the object of its preparations.
[
6]
If on the other
hand inordinate care for the development of our
estates, excess of anxiety over household affairs,
passionate devotion to hunting or the sacrifice of
whole days to the shows of the theatre, rob our
studies of much of the time that is their due (for
every moment that is given to other things involves
a loss of time for study), what, think you, will be the
results of desire, avarice, and envy, which waken such
violent thoughts within our souls that they disturb
our very slumbers and our dreams?
[
7]
There is nothing
so preoccupied, so distracted, so rent and torn by so
many and such varied passions as an evil mind. For
when it cherishes some dark design, it is tormented
with hope, care and anguish of spirit, and even when
it has accomplished its criminal purpose, it is racked
by anxiety, remorse and the fear of all manner of
punishments. Amid such passions as these what
room is there for literature or any virtuous pursuit?
You might as well look for fruit in land that is choked
with thorns and brambles.
[
8]
Well then, I ask you, is
not simplicity of life essential if we are to be able to
endure the toil entailed by study? What can we
hope to get from lust or luxury? Is not the desire
to win praise one of the strongest stimulants to a
[p. 361]
passion for literature? But does that mean that we
are to suppose that praise is an object of concern to
bad men? Surely every one of my readers must by
now have realised that oratory is in the main concerned with the treatment of what is just and
honourable? Can a bad and unjust man speak on
such themes as the dignity of the subject demands?
[
9]
Nay, even if we exclude the most important aspects
of the question now before us, and make the impossible concession that the best and worst of men
may have the same talent, industry and learning, we
are still confronted by the question as to which of
the two is entitled to be called the better orator. The
answer is surely clear enough: it will be he who is
the better man. Consequently, the bad man and the
perfect orator can never be identical.
[
10]
For nothing
is perfect, if there exists something else that is
better. However, as I do not wish to appear to
adopt the practice dear to the Socratics of framing
answers to my own questions, let me assume the
existence of a man so obstinately blind to the truth
as to venture to maintain that a bad man equipped
with the same talents, industry and learning will
be not a whit inferior to the good man as an
orator; and let me show that he too is mad.
[
11]
There is one point at any rate which no one will
question, namely, that the aim of every speech is to
convince the judge that the case which it puts forward is true and honourable. Well then, which will
do this best, the good man or the bad? The good
man will without doubt more often say what is true
and honourable.
[
12]
But even supposing that his duty
should, as I shall show may sometimes happen, lead
him to make statements which are false, his words
[p. 363]
are still certain to carry greater weight with his
audience. On the other hand bad men, in their
contempt for public opinion and their ignorance of
what is right, sometimes drop their mask unawares,
and are impudent in the statement of their case and
shameless in their assertions.
[
13]
Further, in their
attempt to achieve the impossible they display an
unseemly persistency and unavailing energy. For
in lawsuits no less than in the ordinary paths of
life, they cherish depraved expectations. But it
often happens that even when they tell the truth
they fail to win belief, and the mere fact that such
a man is its advocate is regarded as an indication of
the badness of the case.
[
14]
I must now proceed to deal with the objections
which common opinion is practically unanimous in
bringing against this view. Was not Demosthenes
an orator? And yet we are told that he was a bad
man. Was not Cicero an orator? And yet there
are many who have found fault with his character as
well. What am I to answer? My reply will be
highly unpopular and I must first attempt to conciliate my audience.
[
15]
I do not consider that
Demosthenes deserves the serious reflexions that
have been made upon his character to such an
extent that I am bound to believe all the charges
amassed against him by his enemies; for my reading
tells me that his public policy was of the noblest and
his end most glorious.
[
16]
Again, I cannot see that the
aims of Cicero were in any portion of his career other
than such as may become an excellent citizen. As
evidence I would cite the fact that his behaviour as
consul was magnificent and his administration of his
province a model of integrity, while he refused to
[p. 365]
become one of the twenty commissioners,
2 and in the
grievous civil wars which afflicted his generation
beyond all others, neither hope nor fear ever deterred
him from giving his support to the better party, that
is to say, to the interests of the common weal.
Some, it is true, regard him as lacking in courage.
[
17]
The best answer to these critics is to be found in his
own words, to the effect that he was timid not in
confronting peril, but in anticipating it. And this
he proved also by the manner of his death, in meeting
which he displayed a singular fortitude.
[
18]
But even
if these two men lacked the perfection of virtue, I
will reply to those who ask if they were orators, in
the manner in which the Stoics would reply, if asked
whether Zeno, Cleanthes or Chrysippus himself were
wise men. I shall say that they were great men
deserving our veneration, but that they did not
attain to that which is the highest perfection
of man's nature.
[
19]
For did not Pythagoras desire
that he should not be called a wise man, like the
sages who preceded him, but rather a student of
wisdom?
3 But for my own part, conforming to the
language of every day, I have said time and again,
and shall continue to say, that Cicero was a perfect
orator, just as in ordinary speech we call our friends
good and sensible men, although neither of these
titles can really be given to any save to him that
has attained to perfect wisdom. But if I am called
upon to speak strictly and in accordance with the
most rigid laws of truth, I shall proclaim that I seek
to find that same perfect orator whom Cicero also
sought to discover.
[
20]
For while I admit that he stood
on the loftiest pinnacle of eloquence, and can discover scarcely a single deficiency in him, although I
[p. 367]
might perhaps discover certain superfluities which I
think he would have pruned away (for the general
view of the learned is that he possessed many virtues
and a few faults, and he himself
4 states that he has
succeeded in suppressing much of his youthful
exuberance), none the less, in view of the fact that,
although he had by no means a low opinion of himself, he never claimed to be the perfect sage, and,
had he been granted longer life and less troubled conditions for the composition of his works, would doubtless have spoken better still, I shall not lay myself
open to the charge of ungenerous criticism, if I say
that I believe that he failed actually to achieve that
perfection to the attainment of which none have
approached more nearly,
[
21]
and indeed had I felt otherwise in this connexion, I might have defended my
point with greater boldness and freedom.
5 Marcus
Antonius declared that he had seen no man who was
genuinely eloquent (and to be eloquent is a far less
achievement than to be an orator), while Cicero himself has failed to find his orator in actual life and
merely imagines and strives to depict the ideal. Shall
I then be afraid to say that in the eternity of time
that is yet to be, something more perfect may be found
than has yet existed?
[
22]
I say nothing of those critics
who will not allow sufficient credit even for eloquence
to Cicero and Demosthenes, although Cicero himself
does not regard Demosthenes as flawless, but asserts
that he sometimes nods,
6 while even Cicero fails to
satisfy Brutus and Calvus (at any rate they criticised
his style to his face), or to win the complete approval
of either of the Asinii, who in various passages attack
the faults of his oratory in language which is positively
hosthe.
[p. 369]
[
23]
However, let us fly in the face of nature and
assume that a bad man has been discovered who is
endowed with the highest eloquence. I shall none
the less deny that he is an orator. For I should not
allow that every man who has shown himself ready
with his hands was necessarily a brave man, because
true courage cannot be conceived of without the
accompaniment of virtue.
[
24]
Surely the advocate who
is called to defend the accused requires to be a man
of honour, honour which greed cannot corrupt, influence seduce, or fear dismay. Shall we then dignify the traitor, the deserter, the turncoat with the
sacred name of orator? But if the quality which is
usually termed goodness is to be found even in quite
ordinary advocates, why should not the orator, who
has not yet existed, but may still be born, be no less
perfect in character than in excellence of speech?
[
25]
It is no hack-advocate, no hireling pleader, nor yet,
to use no harser term, a serviceable attorney of the
class generally known as
causidici, that I am seeking to
form, but rather a man who to extraordinary natural
gifts has added a thorough mastery of all the fairest
branches of knowledge, a man sent by heaven to be
the blessing of mankind, one to whom all history
can find no parallel, uniquely perfect in every detail
and utterly noble alike in thought and speech.
[
26]
How
small a portion of all these abilities will be required
for the defence of the innocent, the repression of
crime or the support of truth against falsehood in
suits involving questions of money? It is true that
our supreme orator will bear his part in such tasks,
but his powers will be displayed with brighter splendour in greater matters than these, when he is
called upon to direct the counsels of the senate and
[p. 371]
guide the people from the paths of error to better
things.
[
27]
Was not this the man conceived by Virgil
and described as quelling a riot when torches and
stones have begun to fly:
7
“Then, if before their eyes some statesman grave
Stand forth, with virtue and high service crowned,
Straight are they dumb and stand intent to hear.
”
Here then we have one who is before all else a
good man, and it is only after this that the poet adds
that he is skilled in speaking:
“His words their minds control, their passions soothe.”
Again,
[
28]
will not this same man, whom we are striving
to form, if in time of war he be called upon to inspire
his soldiers with courage for the fray, draw for his
eloquence on the innermost precepts of philosophy?
For how can men who stand upon the verge of battle
banish all the crowding fears of hardship, pain and
death from their minds, unless those fears be replaced by the sense of the duty that they owe
their country, by courage and the lively image of a
soldier's honour?
[
29]
And assuredly the man who will
best inspire such feelings in others is he who has
first inspired them in himself. For however we strive
to conceal it, insincerity will always betray itself, and
there was never in any man so great eloquence as
would not begin to stumble and hesitate so soon as
his words ran counter to his inmost thoughts.
[
30]
Now:
a bad man cannot help speaking things other than
he feels. On the other land, the good will never be
at a loss for honourable words or fail to find matter
full of virtue for utterance, since among his virtues
practical wisdom will be one. And even though his
[p. 373]
imagination lacks artifice to lend it charm, its own
nature will be ornament enough, for if honour dictate
the words, we shall find eloquence there as well.
[
31]
Therefore, let those that are young, or rather let all
of us, whatever our age, since it is never too late to
resolve to follow what is right, strive with all our
hearts and devote all our efforts to the pursuit of virtue
and eloquence; and perchance it may be granted to us
to attain to the perfection that we seek. For since
nature does not forbid the attainment of either, why
should not someone succeed in attaining both together? And why should not each of us hope to be
that happy man?
[
32]
But if our powers are inadequate
to such achievement, we shall still be the better for
the double effort in proportion to the distance which
we have advanced toward either goal. At any rate
let us banish from our hearts the delusion that
eloquence, the fairest of all things, can be combined
with vice. The power of speaking is even to be
accounted an evil when it is found in evil men; for it
makes its possessors yet worse than they were before.
[
33]
I think I hear certain persons (for there will
always be some who had rather be eloquent than
good) asking, “Why then is there so much art in connexion with eloquence? Why have you talked so
much of 'glosses,'
8 the methods of defence to be
employed in difficult cases, and sometimes even of
actual confession of guilt, unless it is the case that
the power and force of speech at times triumphs over
truth itself? For a good man will only plead good
cases, and those might safely be left to truth to
support without the aid of learning.”
[
34]
Now, though
my reply to these critics will in the first place be
a defence of my own work, it will also explain what
[p. 375]
I consider to be the duty of a good man on occasions
when circumstances have caused him to undertake the defence of the guilty. For it is by no
means useless to consider how at times we should
speak in defence of falsehood or even of injustice, if
only for this reason, that such an investigation will
enable us to detect and defeat them with the greater
ease, just as the physician who has a thorough
knowledge of all that can injure the health will be
all the more skilful in the prescription of remedies.
[
35]
For the Academicians, although they will argue on
either side of a question, do not thereby commit
themselves to taking one of these two views as their
guide in life to the exclusion of the other, while the
famous Carneades, who is said to have spoken at
Rome in the presence of Cato the Censor, and to
have argued against justice with no less vigour than
he had argued for justice on the preceding day, was
not himself an unjust man. But the nature of virtue
is revealed by vice, its opposite, justice becomes yet
more manifest from the contemplation of injustice,
and there are many other things that are proved by
their contraries. Consequently the schemes of his
adversaries should be no less well known to the
orator than those of the enemy to a commander in
the field.
[
36]
But it is even true, although at first sight
it seems hard to believe, that there may be sound
reason why at times a good man who is appearing
for the defence should attempt to conceal the truth
from the judge. If any of my readers is surprised
at my making such a statement (although this
opinion is not of my own invention, but is derived
from those whom antiquity regarded as the greatest
teachers of wisdom), I would have him reflect that
[p. 377]
there are many things which are made honourable
or the reverse not by the nature of the facts, but by
the causes from which they spring.
[
37]
For if to slay
a man is often a virtue and to put one's own children
to death is at times the noblest of deeds, and if it
is permissible in the public interest to do deeds
yet more horrible to relate than these, we should
assuredly take into consideration not solely and
simply what is the nature of the case which the
good man undertakes to defend, but what is his
reason and what his purpose in so doing.
[
38]
And first
of all everyone must allow, what even the sternest
of the Stoics admit, that the good man will sometimes tell a lie, and further that he will sometimes do
so for comparatively trivial reasons; for example we
tell countless lies to sick children for their good and
make many promises to them which we do not intend
to perform.
[
39]
And there is clearly far more justification for lying when it is a question of diverting
an assassin from his victim or deceiving an enemy
to save our country. Consequently a practice which
is at times reprehensible even in slaves, may on
other occasions be praiseworthy even in a wise man.
If this be granted, I can see that there will be many
possible emergencies such as to justify an orator in
undertaking cases of a kind which, in the absence of
any honourable reason, he would have refused to
touch.
[
40]
In saying this I do not mean that we should
be ready under any circumstances to defend our
father, brother or friend when in peril (since I
hold that we should be guided by stricter rules in
such matters), although such contingencies may
well cause us no little perplexity, when we have to
decide between the rival claims of justice and natural
[p. 379]
affection. But let us put the problem beyond all
question of doubt. Suppose a man to have plotted
against a tyrant and to be accused of having done so.
Which of the two will the orator, as defined by us,
desire to save? And if he undertakes the defence
of the accused, will he not employ falsehood with
no less readiness than the advocate who is defending
a bad case before a jury?
[
41]
Again, suppose that the
judge is likely to condemn acts which were rightly
done, unless we can convince him that they were
never done. Is not this another case where the
orator will not shrink even from lies, if so he may
save one who is not merely innocent, but a praiseworthy citizen? Again, suppose that we realise that
certain acts are just in themselves, though prejudicial
to the state under existing circumstances. Shall we
not then employ methods of speaking which, despite
the excellence of their intention, bear a close resemblance to fraud.
[
42]
Further, no one will hesitate
for a moment to hold the view that it is in the
interests of the commonwealth that guilty persons
should be acquitted rather than punished, if it be
possible thereby to convert them to a better state of
mind, a possibility which is generally conceded. If
then it is clear to an orator that a man who is guilty
of the offences laid to his charge will become a good
man, will he not strive to secure his acquittal?
[
43]
Imagine for example that a skilful commander, without whose aid the state cannot hope to crush its
enemies, is labouring under a charge which is obviously true: will not the common interest irresistibly
summon our orator to defend him? We know at
any rate that Fabricius publicly voted for and secured
the election to the consulate of Cornelius Rufinus,
[p. 381]
despite the tact that he was a bad citizen and his
personal enemy, merely because he knew that he
was a capable general and the state was threatened
with war.
9 And when certain persons expressed
their surprise at his conduct, he replied that he had
rather be robbed by a fellow-citizen than be sold as
a slave by the enemy. Well then, had Fabricius
been an orator, would he not have defended Rufinus
against a charge of peculation, even though his
guilt were as clear as day?
[
44]
I might produce many
other similar examples, but one of them taken at
random is enough. For my purpose is not to
assert that such tasks will often be incumbent
on the orator whom I desire to form, but merely to
show that, in the event of his being compelled to
take such action, it will not invalidate our definition
of an orator as a “good man, skilled in speaking.”
[
45]
And it is necessary also both to teach and learn how
to establish difficult cases by proof. For often even
the best cases have a resemblance to bad and, the
charges which tell heavily against an innocent person frequently have a strong resemblance to the
truth. Consequently, the same methods of defence
have to be employed that would be used if he were
guilty. Further, there are countless elements which
are common to both good cases and bad, such as oral
and documentary evidence, suspicions and opinions,
all of which have to be established or disposed of in
the same way, whether they be true or merely resemble the truth. Therefore, while maintaining his
integrity of purpose, the orator will modify his pleading to suit the circumstances.