[10]
There are, to be sure, philosophers of the very
highest reputation who distinguish theoretically between these three conceptions,1 although they are
indissolubly blended together; and they do this, I
assume, on moral, conscientious principles. [For
whatever is just, they hold, is also expedient; and, in
like manner, whatever is morally right is also just. It
follows, then, that whatever is morally right is also
expedient.] Those who fail to comprehend that
[p. 179]
theory do often, in their admiration for shrewd and
clever men, take craftiness for wisdom. But they
must be disabused of this error and their way of
thinking must be wholly converted to the hope and
conviction that it is only by moral character and
righteousness, not by dishonesty and craftiness, that
they may attain to the objects of their desires.
1 That is, they make a false distinction between (1) moral rectitude that is at the same time expedient; (2) moral rectitude that is (apparently) not expedient; and (3) the expedient that is (apparently) not morally right.
M. Tullius Cicero. De Officiis. With An English Translation. Walter Miller. Cambridge. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass., London, England. 1913.
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