[6]
Although these truths are so self-evident that the1
subject does not call for discussion, still I have discussed it in another connection. If, therefore, these
[p. 9]
schools should claim to be consistent, they could not
say anything about duty; and no fixed, invariable,
natural rules of duty can be posited except by those
who say that moral goodness is worth seeking solely
or chiefly for its own sake. Accordingly, the teaching of ethics is the peculiar right of the Stoics, the
Academicians, and the Peripatetics; for the theories
of Aristo, Pyrrho, and Erillus have been long since
rejected; and yet they would have the right to discuss duty if they had left us any power of choosing
between things, so that there might be a way of
finding out what duty is. I shall, therefore, at this
time and in this investigation follow chiefly the
Stoics, not as a translator, but, as is my custom, I
shall at my own option and discretion draw from
those sources in such measure and in such manner
as shall suit my purpose.
1 Reasons for choice of subject and authorities.
M. Tullius Cicero. De Officiis. With An English Translation. Walter Miller. Cambridge. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass., London, England. 1913.
The Annenberg CPB/Project provided support for entering this text.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.