[152]
43. Now, I think I have explained fully1
enough how moral duties are derived from the four
divisions of moral rectitude. But between those
very actions which are morally right, a conflict and
comparison may frequently arise, as to which of two
moral actions is morally better—a point overlooked by
Panaetius. For, since all moral rectitude springs from
four sources (one of which is prudence; the second,
social instinct; the third, courage; the fourth, temperance),it [p. 157] is often necessary in deciding a question of
duty that these virtues be weighed against one
another.
1 Comparative estimate of duties.
M. Tullius Cicero. De Officiis. With An English Translation. Walter Miller. Cambridge. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass., London, England. 1913.
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