[24]
For, assuming that men knew the future it cannot in any
wise be said—certainly not by the Stoics—that
Pompey would not have taken up arms, that Crassus
would not have crossed the Euphrates, or that Caesar
would not have embarked upon the civil war. If
so, then, the deaths that befell these men were
not determined by Fate. But you will have it
that everything happens by Fate; consequently,
knowledge of the future would have done these
men no good. In reality it would have entirely
deprived the earlier portion of their lives of enjoyment; for how could they have been happy in
reflecting what their ends would be? And so,
however the Stoics turn and twist, all their shrewdness must come to naught. For, if a thing that is
going to happen, may happen in one way or another,
indifferently, chance is predominant; but things that
happen by chance cannot be certain. But if it is
certain what is going to befall me in reference to
any matter and on every occasion, how do the soothsayers help me by saying that the greatest misfortunes await me?
Cicero: De Senectute De Amicitia De Divinatione. With An English Translation. William Armistead Falconer. Cambridge. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass., London, England. 1923.
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