[109]
"Cratippus states his minor premise thus: 'But
there are countless instances of prophecies being fulfilled without the intervention of luck.' On the contrary, I say there isn't even one. Observe how keen
the controversy grows! Now that the minor premise
is denied the conclusion fails. But he retorts: ' You
are unreasonable not to grant it, it is so evident.'
Why 'evident'? 'Because many prophecies come
true.' And what of the fact that many more don't
[p. 495]
come true? Does not this very uncertainty, which
is characteristic of luck, demonstrate that their fulfilment is accounted for by luck and not by any law
of nature? Furthermore, my dear Cratippus—for
my controversy is with you—if that argument of
yours is sound, don't you see that it is equally available in behalf of the means of divination practised by
soothsayers, augurs, Chaldeans and by interpreters
of lightnings, portents, and lots? For each of these
classes will furnish you with at least one instance of
a prophecy that came to pass. Therefore either they
too are all means of divining—and this you very
properly deny—or, if they are not, then, so far as I
can see, the two classes which you permit to remain
are not means of divining. Hence the same reasoning
employed by you to establish the two kinds which
you accept may be used to establish the others which
you reject.
Cicero: De Senectute De Amicitia De Divinatione. With An English Translation. William Armistead Falconer. Cambridge. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass., London, England. 1923.
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