[63]
But in causes like this words are not brought before the court, but that fact on account of
which these words have been introduced into the interdict. Our legislators intended that
restitution should be made, without exception, in every case in which violence had been
offered, threatening life or limb. That generally takes place by the agency of men collected
together and armed; but though the operation be different, still, if the danger is the same,
the case is the same; and then they intended that the law should be the same. For the injury
is not greater if inflicted by your household than if inflicted by your steward; nor if it was
your own slaves who wrought it, is it greater than if the slaves of others, or people hired on
purpose, had done so. It is no worse if your agent did it, than if your neighbor or your
freedman was the person; nor if it was the work of men collected together on purpose, than if
it was the deed of men who offered themselves voluntarily, or of your regular day-labourers.
It is not a more serious injury if inflicted by armed men, than by unarmed men who had as much
power to injure as if they had been armed; nor if it were caused by many, than if it were the
work of one single armed man. For the facts are in an interdict expressed by the circumstances
under which violence usually takes place. If the same violence has been committed under other
circumstances, although it may not be comprehended in the strict language of the interdict, it
still comes under the meaning and intention, and authority of the law.
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