[6]
Although I am persuaded, O judges, that you have not now doubted about the same cause twice,
on account of the obscure and uncertain state of the law, so much as because this trial
appears to affect that man's personal character; and on that account you have delayed
condemning him, and have also given him time to recollect himself. And since that custom has
now become a usual one, and since good men,— men like yourselves.—do the
same when sitting as judges, it is, perhaps, less blamable. But still it appears a thing to be
complained of, because all judicial proceedings have been devised either for the sake of
putting an end to disputes, or of punishing crimes, of which the first is the least important
object, because it is less severe on individuals, and because it is often terminated by some
friendly mediator. The other is most formidable, because it relates to more important matters,
and requires not the honorary assistance of some friend, but the severity and vigour of a
judge.
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M. Tullius Cicero. The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, literally translated by C. D. Yonge, B. A. London. Henry G. Bohn, York Street, Covent Garden. 1856.
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