[25]
There was—there was in the judges of those times, O judges, a divinely-inspired and
singular acuteness, as they thought that they were judges, not only of the defendant, but also
of the accuser and of the witness, as to what was invented, what was brought into the case by
chance or by the opportunity, what was imported into it through corruption, what was distorted
by hope or by fear, what appeared to proceed from any private desire, or any private enmity.
And if the judge does not embrace all these considerations in his deliberation, if he does not
survey and comprehend them all in his mind,—if he thinks that whatever is said from
that witness-box, proceeds from some oracle, then in truth it will be sufficient, as I have
said before, for any judge to preside over this court, and to discharge this duty, who is not
deaf. There will be no reason in the world for requiring any one, whoever he may be, to be
either able or experienced, to qualify him for judging causes.
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