If you would have your children and your wife and
your friends to live for ever, you are silly; for you would
have the things which are not in your power to be in
your power, and the things which belong to others to be
yours. So if you would have your slave to be free from
faults, you are a fool; for you would have badness not to
be badness, but something else.1 But if you wish not to
fail in your desires, you are able to do that. Practise
then this which you are able to do. He is the master of
every man who has the power over the things, which
another person wishes or does not wish, the power to
confer them on him or to take them away. Whoever
then wishes to be free, let him neither wish for any thing
nor avoid anything which depends on others: if he does
not observe this rule, he must be a slave.
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1 Τέλειν is used here, as it often is among the Stoics, to 'wish absolutely,' 'to will.' When Epictetus says 'you would have badness not to be badness,' he means that 'badness' is in the will of him who has the badness, and as you wish to subject it to your will, you are a fool. It is your business, as far as you can, to improve the slave: you may wish this. It is his business to obey your instruction: this is what he ought to wish to do; but for him to will to do this, that lies in himself, not in you. Schweig.
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