Preface: Political Constitutions
I AM aware that some will be at a loss to account for
my interrupting the course of my narrative for the sake
of entering upon the following disquisition on the Roman
constitution. But I think that I have already in many
passages made it fully evident that this particular branch of my
work was one of the necessities imposed on me by the nature of
my original design; and I pointed this out with special clearness in the preface which explained the scope of my history.
I there stated that the feature of my work which was at once
the best in itself, and the most instructive to the students of it,
was that it would enable them to know and fully realise in
what manner, and under what kind of constitution, it came
about that nearly the whole world fell under the power of
Rome
in somewhat less than fifty-three years,—an event certainly
without precedent. This being my settled purpose, I could
see no more fitting period than the present for making a pause,
and examining the truth of the remarks about to be made on
this constitution. In private life if you wish to satisfy yourself
as to the badness or goodness of particular persons, you would
not, if you wish to get a genuine test, examine their conduct
at a time of uneventful repose, but in the hour of brilliant
success or conspicuous reverse. For the true test of a perfect
man is the power of bearing with spirit and dignity violent
changes of fortune. An examination of a constitution should
be conducted in the same way: and therefore being unable to
find in our day a more rapid or more signal change than
that which has happened to
Rome, I reserved my disquistion on its constitution for this place. . . .
What is really educational and beneficial to students of
history is the clear view of the causes of events, and the consequent power of choosing the better policy in a particular
case. Now in every practical undertaking by a state we must
regard as the most powerful agent for success or failure the
form of its constitution; for from this as from a fountain-head
all conceptions and plans of action not only proceed, but
attain their consummation.
Some disconnected fragments which are usually placed at the end of the
first chapter, and form the second chapter of this book, I have placed among
the minor fragments at the end of these volumes. . . .
Classification of Constitutions
Of the Greek republics, which have again and again
risen to greatness and fallen into insignificance, it is not difficult
to speak, whether we recount their past history or venture an
opinion on their future. For to report what is already known
is an easy task, nor is it hard to guess what is to come from
our knowledge of what has been. But in regard to the
Romans it is neither an easy matter to describe their present
state, owing to the complexity of their constitution; nor to
speak with confidence of their future, from our inadequate
acquaintance with their peculiar institutions in the past whether
affecting their public or their private life. It will require then
no ordinary attention and study to get a clear and comprehensive conception of the distinctive features of this constitution.
Now, it is undoubtedly the case that most of those who
Classification of polities. |
profess to give us authoritative instruction
on this subject distinguish three kinds of
constitutions, which they designate kingship,
aristocracy, democracy. But in my opinion the question
might fairly be put to them, whether they name these as
being the
only ones, or as the
best. In either case I think
they are wrong. For it is plain that we must regard as the
best constitution that which partakes of all these three
elements. And this is no mere assertion, but has been proved
by the example of Lycurgus, who was the first to construct a
constitution—that of Sparta—on this principle. Nor can we
admit that these are the
only forms: for we have had before
now examples of absolute and tyrannical forms of government,
which, while differing as widely as possible from kingship, yet
appear to have some points of resemblance to it; on which
account all absolute rulers falsely assume and use, as far as
they can, the title of king. Again there have been many
instances of oligarchical governments having in appearance
some analogy to aristocracies, which are, if I may say so, as
different from them as it is possible to be. The same also
holds good about democracy.
The Rotation of Polities
I will illustrate the truth of what I say. We cannot
Six forms of polity, and their natural cycle. |
hold every absolute government to be a kingship, but only that which is accepted voluntarily, and is directed by an appeal to reason
rather than to fear and force. Nor again is every oligarchy
to be regarded as an aristocracy; the latter exists only
where the power is wielded by the justest and wisest men
selected on their merits. Similarly, it is not enough to constitute a democracy that the whole crowd of citizens should
have the right to do whatever they wish or propose. But
where reverence to the gods, succour of parents, respect to
elders, obedience to laws, are traditional and habitual, in such
communities, if the will of the majority prevail, we may speak
of the form of government as a democracy. So then we
enumerate six forms of government,—the three commonly
spoken of which I have just mentioned, and three more allied
forms, I mean despotism, oligarchy and mob-rule. The first
of these arises without artificial aid and in the natural order of
events. Next to this, and produced from it by the aid of art
and adjustment, comes kingship; which degenerating into the
evil form allied to it, by which I mean tyranny, both are once
more destroyed and aristocracy produced. Again the latter
being in the course of nature perverted to oligarchy, and the
people passionately avenging the unjust acts of their rulers,
democracy comes into existence; which again by its violence
and contempt of law becomes sheer mob-rule.
1 No clearer
proof of the truth of what I say could be obtained than by a
careful observation of the natural origin, genesis, and decadence
of these several forms of government. For it is only by seeing
distinctly how each of them is produced that a distinct view
can also be obtained of its growth, zenith, and decadence,
and the time, circumstance, and place in which each of these
may be expected to recur. This method I have assumed to
be especially applicable to the Roman constitution, because
its origin and growth have from the first followed natural
causes.
The Origin of Constitutions
Now the natural laws which regulate the merging of one
form of government into another are perhaps discussed with
greater accuracy by Plato and some other philosophers. But
their treatment, from its intricacy and exhaustiveness, is only
within the capacity of a few. I will therefore endeavour to
give a summary of the subject, just so far as I suppose it to fall
within the scope of a practical history and the intelligence of
ordinary people. For if my exposition appear in any way
inadequate, owing to the general terms in which it is expressed,
the details contained in what is immediately to follow will
amply atone for what is left for the present unsolved.
What is the origin then of a constitution, and whence is it
The origin of the social compact. |
produced? Suppose that from floods, pestilences, failure of crops, or some such causes
the race of man is reduced almost to extinction. Such things we are told have happened, and it is
reasonable to think will happen again. Suppose accordingly
all knowledge of social habits and arts to have been lost.
Suppose that from the survivors, as from seeds, the race of
man to have again multiplied. In that case I presume they
would, like the animals, herd together; for it is but reasonable
to suppose that bodily weakness would induce them to seek
those of their own kind to herd with. And in that case too,
as with the animals, he who was superior to the rest in strength
of body or courage of soul would lead and rule them. For
what we see happen in the case of animals that are without the
faculty of reason, such as bulls, goats, and cocks,—among
whom there can be no dispute that the strongest take the lead,
—that we must regard as in the truest sense the teaching of
nature. Originally then it is probable that the condition of
life among men was this,—herding together like animals and
following the strongest and bravest as leaders. The limit of
this authority would be physical strength, and the name we
should give it would be despotism. But as soon as the idea
of family ties and social relation has arisen amongst such
agglomerations of men, then is born also the idea of kingship,
and then for the first time mankind conceives the notion of
goodness and justice and their reverse.
Origin of Morality and Rule
The way in which such conceptions originate and come
into existence is this. The intercourse of
the sexes is an instinct of nature, and the
result is the birth of children. Now, if any
one of these children who have been brought up, when
arrived at maturity, is ungrateful and makes no return to those
by whom he was nurtured, but on the contrary presumes to
injure them by word and deed, it is plain that he will probably
offend and annoy such as are present, and have seen the care
and trouble bestowed by the parents on the nurture and
bringing up of their children. For seeing that men differ from
the other animals in being the only creatures possessed of
reasoning powers, it is clear that such a difference of conduct
is not likely to escape their observation; but that they will
remark it when it occurs, and express their displeasure on the
spot: because they will have an eye to the future, and will
reason on the likelihood of the same occurring to each of
themselves. Again, if a man has been rescued or helped in
an hour of danger, and, instead of showing gratitude to his
preserver, seeks to do him harm, it is clearly probable that the
rest will be displeased and offended with him, when they know
it: sympathising with their neighbour and imagining themselves
in his case. Hence arises a notion in every breast of the
meaning and theory of duty, which is in fact the beginning
and end of justice. Similarly, again, when any one man
stands out as the champion of all in a time of danger, and
braves with firm courage the onslaught of the most powerful
wild beasts, it is probable that such a man would meet with
marks of favour and pre-eminence from the common people;
while he who acted in a contrary way would fall under their
contempt and dislike.
Morality transmutes despotism into kingship |
From this, once more, it is reasonable
to suppose that there would arise in the minds of the multitude a theory of the disgraceful and the
honourable, and of the difference between
them; and that one should be sought and
imitated for its advantages, the other shunned. When, therefore, the leading and most powerful man among his people
ever encourages such persons in accordance with the popular
sentiment, and thereby assumes in the eyes of his subject the
appearance of being the distributor to each man according to
his deserts, they no longer obey him and support his rule from
fear of violence, but rather from conviction of its utility, however old he may be, rallying round him with one heart and soul,
and fighting against all who form designs against his government. In this way he becomes a king instead of a despot by
imperceptible degrees, reason having ousted brute courage and
bodily strength from their supremacy.
How Kingship Turns into Tyranny
This then is the natural process of formation among
mankind of the notion of goodness and justice, and their
opposites; and this is the origin and genesis of genuine kingship: for people do not only keep up the government of such
men personally, but for their descendants also for many generations; from the conviction that those who are born from and
educated by men of this kind will have principles also like
theirs. But if they subsequently become displeased with their
descendants, they do not any longer decide their choice of
rulers and kings by their physical strength or brute courage;
but by the differences of their intellectual and reasoning
faculties, from practical experience of the decisive importance
of such a distinction.
Kingship in its turn degenerates into tyranny. |
In old times, then,
those who were once thus selected, and obtained this office, grew old in their royal
functions, making magnificent strongholds and surrounding
them with walls and extending their frontiers, partly for the
security of their subjects, and partly to provide them with
abundance of the necessaries of life; and while engaged in
these works they were exempt from all vituperation or jealousy;
because they did not make their distinctive dress, food, or drink,
at all conspicuous, but lived very much like the rest, and joined
in the everyday employments of the common people. But
when their royal power became hereditary in their family, and
they found every necessary for security ready to their hands,
as well as more than was necessary for their personal support,
then they gave the rein to their appetites; imagined that
rulers must needs wear different clothes from those of
subjects; have different and elaborate luxuries of the table;
and must even seek sensual indulgence, however unlawful the
source, without fear of denial. These things having given rise
in the one case to jealousy and offence, in the other to outburst of hatred and passionate resentment, the kingship
became a tyranny: the first step in disintegration was taken;
and plots began to be formed against the government, which
did not now proceed from the worst men but from the noblest,
most high-minded, and most courageous, because these are
the men who can least submit to the tyrannical acts of their
rulers.
Degeneration of Constitutions
But as soon as the people got leaders, they cooperated with them against the dynasty for
Tyranny is then displaced by aristocracy |
the reasons I have mentioned; and then
kingship and despotism were alike entirely
abolished, and aristocracy once more began to revive and
start afresh. For in their immediate gratitude to those
who had deposed the despots, the people employed them as
leaders, and entrusted their interests to them; who, looking
upon this charge at first as a great privilege, made the public
advantage their chief concern, and conducted all kinds of
business, public or private, with diligence and caution. But
when the sons of these men received the same position of
authority from their fathers,—having had no experience of
misfortunes, and none at all of civil equality and freedom of
speech, but having been bred up from the first under the
shadow of their fathers' authority and lofty position,—some
of them gave themselves up with passion to avarice and
unscrupulous love of money, others to drinking and the
boundless debaucheries which accompanies it,
and others to the violation of women or the
forcible appropriation of boys; and so they
turned an aristocracy into an oligarchy.
Aristocracy degenerates into oligarchy |
But it was not long
before they roused in the minds of the people the same
feelings as before; and their fall therefore was very like the
disaster which befell the tyrants.
How Democracy Arises and Degenerates
For no sooner had the knowledge of the jealousy and
Oligarchy is replaced by democracy |
hatred existing in the citizens against them
emboldened some one to oppose the government by word or deed, than he was sure to
find the whole people ready and prepared to take his side.
Having then got rid of these rulers by assassination or exile,
they do not venture to set up a king again, being still in terror
of the injustice to which this led before; nor dare they intrust
the common interests again to more than one, considering the
recent example of their misconduct: and therefore, as the only
sound hope left them is that which depends upon themselves,
they are driven to take refuge in that; and so changed the
constitution from an oligarchy to a democracy, and took upon
themselves the superintendence and charge of the state. And
as long as any survive who have had experience of oligarchical
supremacy and domination, they regard their present constitution as a blessing, and hold equality and freedom as
of the utmost value. But as soon as a new generation has
arisen, and the democracy has descended to their children's
children, long association weakens their value for equality
and freedom, and some seek to become more powerful
than the ordinary citizens; and the most liable to this temptation are the rich.
Democracy degenerates into rule of corruption and violence, only to be stopped by a return to despotism. |
So when they begin to be fond of office,
and find themselves unable to obtain it by
their own unassisted efforts and their own
merits, they ruin their estates, while enticing
and corrupting the common people in every
possible way. By which means when, in their
senseless mania for reputation, they have made
the populace ready and greedy to receive bribes, the virtue of
democracy is destroyed, and it is transformed into a government
of violence and the strong hand. For the mob,
habituated to feed at the expense of others, and to have its
hopes of a livelihood in the property of its neighbours, as soon
as it has got a leader sufficiently ambitious and daring, being
excluded by poverty from the sweets of civil honours, produces a reign of mere violence. Then come tumultuous
assemblies, massacres, banishments, redivisions of land; until,
after losing all trace of civilisation, it has once more found a
master and a despot.
This is the regular cycle of constitutional revolutions, and
the natural order in which constitutions change, are transformed, and return again to their original stage. If a man
have a clear grasp of these principles he may perhaps make a
mistake as to the dates at which this or that will happen to a
particular constitution; but he will rarely be entirely mistaken
as to the stage of growth or decay at which it has arrived, or
as to the point at which it will undergo some revolutionary
change. However, it is in the case of the Roman constitution
that this method of inquiry will most fully teach us its
formation, its growth, and zenith, as well as the changes
awaiting it in the future; for this, if any constitution ever did,
owed, as I said just now, its original foundation and growth
to natural causes, and to natural causes will owe its decay. My
subsequent narrative will be the best illustration of what I say.
Lycurgus
For the present I will make a brief reference to the
Lycurgus recognised these truths, and legislated accordingly. |
legislation of Lycurgus: for such a discussion
is not at all alien to my subject. That statesman was fully aware that all those changes
which I have enumerated come about by an
undeviating law of nature; and reflected that every form of
government that was unmixed, and rested on one species of
power, was unstable; because it was swiftly perverted into that
particular form of evil peculiar to it and inherent in its nature.
For just as rust is the natural dissolvent of iron, wood-worms
and grubs to timber, by which they are destroyed without any
external injury, but by that which is engendered in themselves;
so in each constitution there is naturally engendered a particular
vice inseparable from it: in kingship it is absolutism; in
aristocracy it is oligarchy; in democracy lawless ferocity and
violence; and to these vicious states all these forms of government are, as I have lately shown, inevitably transformed.
Lycurgus, I say, saw all this, and accordingly combined
together all the excellences and distinctive features of the best
constitutions, that no part should become unduly predominant,
and be perverted into its kindred vice; and that, each power
being checked by the others, no one part should turn the scale
or decisively out-balance the others; but that, by being
accurately adjusted and in exact equilibrium, the whole might
remain long steady like a ship sailing close to the wind. The
royal power was prevented from growing insolent by fear of
the people, which had also assigned to it an adequate share
in the constitution. The people in their turn were restrained from a bold contempt of the kings by fear of
the Gerusia: the members of which, being selected on grounds
of merit, were certain to throw their influence on the side of
justice in every question that arose; and thus the party placed
at a disadvantage by its conservative tendency was always
strengthened and supported by the weight and influence of
the Gerusia. The result of this combination has been that the
Lacedaemonians retained their freedom for the longest period
of any people with which we are acquainted.
Lycurgus however established his constitution without the
discipline of adversity, because he was able to foresee by the
light of reason the course which events naturally take and the
source from which they come. But though the Romans have
arrived at the same result in framing their commonwealth, they
have not done so by means of abstract reasoning, but through
many struggles and difficulties, and by continually adopting
reforms from knowledge gained in disaster. The result has
been a constitution like that of Lycurgus, and the best of any
existing in my time. . . .
The Roman Constitution
I have given an account of the constitution of Lycurgus,
I will now endeavour to describe that of
Rome at the period
of their disastrous defeat at
Cannae.
I am fully conscious that to those who actually live under
this constitution I shall appear to give an inadequate account
of it by the omission of certain details.
The Roman constitution at the epoch of Cannae, B.C. 216. |
Knowing accurately every portion of it from personal
experience, and from having been bred up in
its customs and laws from childhood, they will
not be struck so much by the accuracy of the description,
as annoyed by its omissions; nor will they believe that the
historian has purposely omitted unimportant distinctions, but
will attribute his silence upon the origin of existing institutions
or other important facts to ignorance. What is told they depreciate as insignificant or beside the purpose; what is omitted
they desiderate as vital to the question: their object being to
appear to know more than the writers. But a good critic
should not judge a writer by what he leaves unsaid, but from
what he says: if he detects mis-statement in the latter, he may
then feel certain that ignorance accounts for the former; but
if what he says is accurate, his omissions ought to be attributed
to deliberate judgment and not to ignorance. So much for
those whose criticisms are prompted by personal ambition
rather than by justice. . . .
Another requisite for obtaining a judicious approval for an
historical disquisition, is that it should be germane to the
matter in hand; if this is not observed, though its style may
be excellent and its matter irreproachable, it will seem out of
place, and disgust rather than please. . . .
As for the Roman constitution, it had three elements,
Triple element in the Roman Constitution. |
each of them possessing sovereign powers:
and their respective share of power in the
whole state had been regulated with such a
scrupulous regard to equality and equilibrium, that no one
could say for certain, not even a native, whether the constitution as a whole were an aristocracy or democracy or
despotism. And no wonder: for if we confine our observation
to the power of the Consuls we should be inclined to regard it
as despotic; if on that of the Senate, as aristocratic; and
if finally one looks at the power possessed by the people it
would seem a clear case of a democracy. What the exact
powers of these several parts were, and still, with slight modifications, are, I will now state.
The Consuls
The Consuls, before leading out the legions, remain
in
Rome and are supreme masters of the
administration. All other magistrates, except
the Tribunes, are under them and take their orders. They
introduce foreign ambassadors to the Senate; bring matters
requiring deliberation before it; and see to the execution
of its decrees. If, again, there are any matters of state
which require the authorisation of the people, it is their
business to see to them, to summon the popular meetings, to
bring the proposals before them, and to carry out the decrees
of the majority. In the preparations for war also, and in a
word in the entire administration of a campaign, they have all
but absolute power. It is competent to them to impose on
the allies such levies as they think good, to appoint the
Military Tribunes, to make up the roll for soldiers and select
those that are suitable. Besides they have absolute power of
inflicting punishment on all who are under their command
while on active service: and they have authority to expend as
much of the public money as they choose, being accompanied
by a quaestor who is entirely at their orders. A survey of
these powers would in fact justify our describing the constitution as despotic,—a clear case of royal government.
Nor will it affect the truth of my description, if any of the
institutions I have described are changed in our time, or in
that of our posterity: and the same remarks apply to what
follows.
The Senate
The Senate has first of all the control of the treasury,
and regulates the receipts and disbursements
alike. For the Quaestors cannot issue any
public money for the various departments of the state
without a decree of the Senate, except for the service of
the Consuls. The Senate controls also what is by far the
largest and most important expenditure, that, namely, which
is made by the censors every
lustrum for the repair or construction of public buildings; this money cannot be obtained
by the censors except by the grant of the Senate. Similarly all
crimes committed in
Italy requiring a public investigation,
such as treason, conspiracy, poisoning, or wilful murder, are
in the hands of the Senate. Besides, if any individual or state
among the Italian allies requires a controversy to be settled, a
penalty to be assessed, help or protection to be afforded,—all
this is the province of the Senate. Or again, outside
Italy, if
it is necessary to send an embassy to reconcile warring communities, or to remind them of their duty, or sometimes to
impose requisitions upon them, or to receive their submission,
or finally to proclaim war against them,—this too is the
business of the Senate. In like manner the reception to be given
to foreign ambassadors in
Rome, and the answers to be returned to them,
are decided by the Senate. With such business the people have nothing to do. Consequently, if one
were staying at
Rome when the Consuls were not in town, one
would imagine the constitution to be a complete aristocracy:
and this has been the idea entertained by many Greeks, and
by many kings as well, from the fact that nearly all the business
they had with
Rome was settled by the Senate.
The People
After this one would naturally be inclined to ask
what part is left for the people in the constitution, when the Senate has these various
functions, especially the control of the receipts and expenditure of the exchequer; and when the Consuls, again,
have absolute power over the details of military preparation,
and an absolute authority in the field? There is, however,
a part left the people, and it is a most important one.
For the people is the sole fountain of honour and of punishment; and it is by these two things and these alone that
dynasties and constitutions and, in a word, human society are
held together: for where the distinction between them is not
sharply drawn both in theory and practice, there no undertaking can be properly administered,—as indeed we might expect
when good and bad are held in exactly the same honour.
The people then are the only court to decide matters of life
and death; and even in-cases where the penalty is money, if
the sum to be assessed is sufficiently serious, and especially
when the accused have held the higher magistracies. And in
regard to this arrangement there is one point deserving especial
commendation and record. Men who are on trial for their
lives at
Rome, while sentence is in process of being voted,—if
even only one of the tribes whose votes are needed to ratify the
sentence has not voted,—have the privilege at
Rome of openly
departing and condemning themselves to a voluntary exile.
Such men are safe at
Naples or
Praeneste or at
Tibur, and
at other towns with which this arrangement has been duly
ratified on oath.
Again, it is the people who bestow offices on the deserving,
which are the most honourable rewards of virtue. It has also
the absolute power of passing or repealing laws; and, most
important of all, it is the people who deliberate on the question
of peace or war. And when provisional terms are made for
alliance, suspension of hostilities, or treaties, it is the people
who ratify them or the reverse.
These considerations again would lead one to say that the
chief power in the state was the people's, and that the constitution was a democracy.
Division of Political Power At Rome
Such, then, is the distribution of power between the
The mutual relation of the three. |
several parts of the state. I must now show
how each of these several parts can, when they
choose, oppose or support each other.
The Consul, then, when he has started on an expedition
The Consul dependent on the Senate, |
with the powers I have described, is to all
appearance absolute in the administration of
the business in hand; still be has need of
the support both of people and Senate, and, without them,
is quite unable to bring the matter to a successful conclusion. For it is plain that he must have supplies sent to his
legions from time to time; but without a decree of the Senate
they can be supplied neither with corn, nor clothes, nor pay,
so that all the plans of a commander must be futile, if the
Senate is resolved either to shrink from danger or hamper his
plans. And again, whether a Consul shall bring any undertaking to a conclusion or no depends entirely upon the Senate:
for it has absolute authority at the end of a year to send another Consul to supersede him, or to continue the existing one
in his command. Again, even to the successes of the generals
the Senate has the power to add distinction and glory, and on
the other hand to obscure their merits and lower their credit,
For these high achievements are brought in tangible form before the eyes of the citizens by what are called "triumphs."
But these triumphs the commanders cannot celebrate with
proper pomp, or in some cases celebrate at all, unless the
Senate concurs and grants the necessary money.
As for the
people, the Consuls are pre-eminently obliged
to court their favour, however distant from
home may be the field of their operations; for
it is the people, as I have said before, that ratifies, or refuses
to ratify, terms of peace and treaties; but most of all because
when laying down their office they have to give an
account
2
of their administration before it. Therefore in no case is it
safe for the Consuls to neglect either the Senate or the goodwill of the people.
The Senate Controlled by the People
As for the Senate, which possesses the immense
power I have described, in the first place
it is obliged in public affairs to take the
multitude into account, and respect the
wishes of the people; and it cannot put into execution the
penalty for offences against the republic, which are punishable with death, unless the people first ratify its decrees.
Similarly even in matters which directly affect the senators,—
for instance, in the case of a law diminishing the Senate's
traditional authority, or depriving senators of certain dignities
and offices, or even actually cutting down their property,—
even in such cases the people have the sole power of passing
or rejecting the law. But most important of all is the fact
that, if the Tribunes interpose their veto, the Senate not only
are unable to pass a decree, but cannot even hold a meeting
at all, whether formal or informal. Now, the Tribunes are
always bound to carry out the decree of the people, and above
all things to have regard to their wishes: therefore, for all these
reasons the Senate stands in awe of the multitude, and cannot
neglect the feelings of the people.
Powers of the Senate
In like manner the people on its part is far from
being independent of the Senate, and is bound to take its
wishes into account both collectively and individually. For
contracts, too numerous to count, are given out by the
censors in all parts of
Italy for the repairs
or construction of public buildings; there
is also the collection of revenue from many
rivers, harbours, gardens, mines, and land—everything, in a
word, that comes under the control of the Roman government:
and in all these the people at large are engaged; so that there
is scarcely a man, so to speak, who is not interested either as
a contractor or as being employed in the works.
The people dependent on the Senate |
For some.
purchase the contracts from the censors for themselves; and
others go partners with them; while others again go security
for these contractors, or actually pledge their property to the
treasury for them. Now over all these transactions the Senate
has absolute control. It can grant an extension of time; and
in case of unforeseen accident can relieve the contractors from
a portion of their obligation, or release them from it altogether,
if they are absolutely unable to fulfil it. And there are many
details in which the Senate can inflict great hardships, or, on
the other hand, grant great indulgences to the contractors: for
in every case the appeal is to it. But the most important
point of all is that the judges are taken from its members in
the majority of trials, whether public or private, in which the
charges are heavy.
3 Consequently, all citizens are much at its
mercy; and being alarmed at the uncertainty as to when they
may need its aid, are cautious about resisting or actively
opposing its will.
And for a similar reason
men do not rashly resist the wishes of the
Consuls, because one and all may become subject to their
absolute authority on a campaign.
Interdependency Brings Strength
The result of this power of the several estates for
mutual help or harm is a union sufficiently firm for all emergencies, and a constitution than which it is impossible to find
a better. For whenever any danger from without compels
them to unite and work together, the strength which is developed by the State is so extraordinary, that everything required
is unfailingly carried out by the eager rivalry shown by all
classes to devote their whole minds to the need of the hour,
and to secure that any determination come to should not fail
for want of promptitude; while each individual works, privately
and publicly alike, for the accomplishment of the business in
hand. Accordingly, the peculiar constitution of the State
makes it irresistible, and certain of obtaining whatever it
determines to attempt. Nay, even when these external alarms
are past, and the people are enjoying their good fortune and
the fruits of their victories, and, as usually happens, growing
corrupted by flattery and idleness, show a tendency to violence
and arrogance,—it is in these circumstances, more than ever,
that the constitution is seen to possess within itself the power
of correcting abuses. For when any one of the three classes
becomes puffed up, and manifests an inclination to be contentious and unduly encroaching, the mutual interdependency
of all the three, and the possibility of the pretensions of any
one being checked and thwarted by the others, must plainly
check this tendency: and so the proper equilibrium is maintained by the impulsiveness of the one part being checked
by its fear of the other. . . .
On the Roman Army
After electing the Consuls they proceed to elect military tribunes,—fourteen from those who had five years', and
ten from those who had ten years', service. All citizens must
serve ten years in the cavalry or twenty years in the infantry
before the forty-sixth year of their age, except those rated
below four hundred asses. The latter are employed in the
navy; but if any great public necessity arises they are obliged
to serve as infantry also for twenty campaigns: and no one can
hold an office in the state until he has completed ten years of
military service. . . .
When the Consuls are about to enrol the army they
give public notice of the day on which all
Roman citizens of military age must appear.
This is done every year. When the day has arrived,
and the citizens fit for service are come to
Rome and
have assembled on the Capitoline, the fourteen junior
tribunes divide themselves, in the order in which they were
appointed by the people or by the Imperators, into four
divisions, because the primary division of the forces thus raised
is into four legions. The four tribunes first appointed are
assigned to the legion called the 1st; the next three to the
2d; the next four to the 3d; and the three last to the
4th. Of the ten senior tribunes, the two first are assigned to
the 1st legion; the next three to the 2d; the two next to
the 3d; and the three last to the 4th.
Allocation of Men to the Legions
This division and assignment of the tribunes having
been settled in such a way that all four legions have an
equal number of officers, the tribunes of the several legions
take up a separate position and draw lots for the tribes
one by one; and summon the tribe on whom it from time
to time falls. From this tribe they select four young men
as nearly like each other in age and physical strength as
possible. These four are brought forward, and the tribunes
of the first legion picks out one of them, those of the second
another, those of the third another, and the fourth has to
take the last. When the next four are selected the tribunes
of the second legion have the first choice, and those of the first
the last. With the next four the tribunes of the third legion
have the first choice, those of the second the last; and so on
in regular rotation: of which the result is that each legion
gets men of much the same standard. But when they have
selected the number prescribed,—which is four thousand two
hundred infantry for each legion, or at times of special danger
five thousand,—they next used to pass men for the cavalry, in
old times
after the four thousand two hundred infantry; but
now they do it before them, the selection having been made by
the censor on the basis of wealth; and they enrol three hundred
for each legion.
4
Fourfold Division of the Legionaries
The roll having been completed in this manner, the
tribunes belonging to the several legions muster their men;
and selecting one of the whole body that they think most
suitable for the purpose, they cause him to take an oath that
he will obey his officers and do their orders to the best of his
ability. And all the others come up and take the oath
separately, merely affirming that they will do the same as the
first man.
At the same time the Consuls send orders to the magistrates
of the allied cities in
Italy, from which they determine that
allied troops are to serve: declaring the number required, and
the day and place at which the men selected must appear.
The cities then enrol their troops with much the same
ceremonies as to selection and administration of the oath, and
appoint a commander and a paymaster.
5
The Military Tribunes at
Rome, after the administering
Fourfold division of the Legionaries. |
of the oath to their men, and giving out the
day and place at which they are to appear
without arms, for the present dismiss them.
When they arrive on the appointed day, they first select the
youngest and poorest to form the
Velites, the next to them
the
Hastati, while those who are in the prime of life they
select as
Principes, and the oldest of all as
Triarii. For in
the Roman army these divisions, distinct not only as to their
ages and nomenclature, but also as to the manner in which
they are armed, exist in each legion. The division is made in such
proportions that the senior men, called
Triarii, should number
six hundred, the
Principes twelve hundred, the
Hastati twelve
hundred, and that all the rest as the youngest should be
reckoned among the
Velites. And if the whole number of the
legion is more than four thousand, they vary the numbers of
these divisions proportionally, except those of the
Triarii,
which is always the same.
Arms of the Youngest Roman Soldiers
The youngest soldiers or
Velites are ordered to
carry a sword, spears, and target (
parma). The
target is strongly made, and large enough to
protect the man; being round, with a diameter
of three feet. Each man also wears a headpiece without a
crest (
galea); which he sometimes covers with a piece of
wolfs skin or something of that kind, for the sake both of
protection and identification; that the officers of his company
may be able to observe whether he shows courage or the
reverse on confronting dangers. The spear of the velites has
a wooden haft of about two cubits, and about a finger's
breadth in thickness; its head is a span long, hammered fine,
and sharpened to such an extent that it becomes bent the first
time it strikes, and cannot be used by the enemy to hurl
back; otherwise the weapon would be available for both
sides alike.
Arms of the Other Soldiers
The second rank, the
Hastati, are ordered
to have the
complete panoply. This to a Roman means,
first, a large shield (
scutum), the surface of
which is curved outwards, its breadth two and
a half feet, its length four feet,—though there is also an extra
sized shield in which these measures are increased by a palm's
breadth. It consists of two layers of wood fastened together
with bull's-hide glue; the outer surface of which is first
covered with canvas, then with calf's skin, on the upper and
lower edges it is bound with iron to resist the downward
strokes of the sword, and the wear of resting upon the ground.
Upon it also is fixed an iron boss (
umbo), to resist the more formidable blows of stones and pikes, and of heavy missiles
generally. With the shield they also carry a sword (
gladius）
hanging down by their right thigh, which is called a Spanish
sword.
6 It has an excellent point, and can deal a formidable
blow with either edge, because its blade is stout and unbending.
In addition to these they have two
pila, a brass helmet, and
greaves (
ocreae). Some of the
pila are thick, some fine.
Of the thicker, some are round with the diameter of a palm's
length, others are a palm square. The fine pila are like
moderate sized hunting spears, and they are carried along with
the former sort. The wooden haft of them all is about three
cubits long; and the iron head fixed to each half is barbed, and
of the same length as the haft. They take extraordinary pains
to attach the head to the haft firmly; they make the fastening
of the one to the other so secure for use by binding it half
way up the wood, and riveting it with a series of clasps, that
the iron breaks sooner than this fastening comes loose,
although its thickness at the socket and where it is fastened
to the wood is a finger and a half's breadth. Besides these
each man is decorated with a plume of feathers, with three
purple or black feathers standing upright, about a cubit long.
The effect of these being placed on the helmet, combined with
the rest of the armour, is to give the man the appearance of
being twice his real height, and to give him a noble aspect
calculated to strike terror into the enemy. The common
soldiers also receive a brass plate, a span square, which they
put upon their breast and call a breastpiece (
pectorale),
and so complete their panoply. Those who are rated above
a hundred thousand asses, instead of these breastpieces
wear, with the rest of their armour, coats of mail (
loricae).
The Principes and Triarii are armed in the same way as the
Hastati, except that instead of
pila they carry long spears
(
hastae).
Officers of Infantry and Cavalry
The
Principes, Hastati, and
Triarii, each elect ten
centurions according to merit, and then a
second ten each. All these sixty have the
title of centurion alike, of whom the first man
chosen is a member of the council of war. And they in
their turn select a rear-rank officer each who is called
optio.
Next, in conjunction with the centurions, they divide the
several orders (omitting the
Velites) into ten companies each,
and appoint to each company two centurions and two
optiones; the
Velites are divided equally among all the companies;
these companies are called orders (
ordines) or maniples
(
manipuli), or vexilla, and their officers are called centurions or
ordinum ductores.7
Each maniple selects two of their strongest
and best born men as standard-bearers (
vexillarii). And that
each maniple should have two commanding officers is only
reasonable; for it being impossible to know what a commander
may be doing or what may happen to him, and necessities of
war admitting of no parleying, they are anxious that the
maniple may never be without a leader and commander.
When the two centurions are both on the field, the first elected
commands the right of the maniple, the second the left: if
both are not there, the one who is commands the whole. And
they wish the centurions not to be so much bold and adventurous, as men with a faculty for command, steady, and of a
profound rather than a showy spirit; not prone to engage
wantonly or be unnecessarily forward in giving battle; but such
as in the face of superior numbers and overwhelming pressure
will die in defence of their post.
Officers and Armour of the Cavalry
Similarly they divide the cavalry into ten squadrons
Officers and arms of the equites. |
(
turmae), and from each they select three
officers (
decuriones), who each select a subaltern (
optio). The decurio first elected
commands the squadron, the other two have the rank
of
decuriones: a name indeed which applies to all alike. If
the first
decurio is not on the field, the second takes command
of the squadron. The armour of the cavalry is very like that
in
Greece. In old times they did not wear the lorica, but
fought in their tunics (
campestria); the result of which was
that they were prompt and nimble at dismounting and
mounting again with despatch, but were in great danger at
close quarters from the unprotected state of their bodies.
And their lances too were useless in two ways: first because
they were thin, and prevented their taking a good aim; and
before they could get the head fixed in the enemy, the
lances were so shaken by the mere motion of the horse
that they generally broke. Secondly, because, having no
spike at the butt end of their lance, they only had one stroke,
namely that with the spear-head; and if the lance broke, what
was left in their hands was entirely useless. Again they used
to have shields of bull's hide, just like those round cakes, with
a knob in the middle which are used at sacrifices, which were
useless at close quarters because they were flexible rather than
firm; and, when their leather shrunk and rotted from the rain,
unserviceable as they were before, they then became entirely
so. Wherefore, as experience showed them the uselessness of
these, they lost no time in changing to the Greek fashion of
arms: the advantages of which were, first, that men were able
to deliver the first stroke of their lance-head with a good
aim and effect, because the shaft from the nature of its construction was steady and not quivering; and, secondly, that they
were able, by reversing the lance, to use the spike at the buttend for a steady and effective blow. And the same may be
said about the Greek shields: for, whether used to ward off
a blow or to thrust against the enemy, they neither give nor
bend. When the Romans learnt these facts about the Greek
arms they were not long in copying them; for no nation has
ever surpassed them in readiness to adopt new fashions from
other people, and to imitate what they see is better in others
than themselves.
The Roman Camp
Having made this distribution of their men and
given orders for their being armed, as I have
described, the military tribunes dismiss them
to their homes. But when the day has arrived
on which they were all bound by their oath to appear at
the place named by the Consuls (for each Consul generally
appoints a separate place for his own legions, each having
assigned to him two legions and a moiety of the allies), all
whose names were placed on the roll appear without fail: no
excuse being accepted in the case of those
who have taken the oath, except a prohibitory
omen or absolute impossibility.
The allies muster along
with the citizens, and are distributed and managed by
the officers appointed by the Consuls, who have the title
of
Praefecti sociis and are twelve in number. These officers
select for the Consuls from the whole infantry and cavalry
of the allies such as are most fitted for actual service,
and these are called
extraordinarii (which in Greek is
ἐπίλεκτοι). The whole number of the infantry of the socii
generally equals that of the legions, but the cavalry is treble
that of the citizens. Of these they select a third of the
cavalry, and a fifth of the infantry to serve as
extraordinarii.
The rest they divide into two parts, one of which is called the
right, the other the left wing (
alae).
These arrangements made, the military tribunes take over
the citizens and allies and proceed to form a camp. Now the
principle on which they construct their camps, no matter when
or where, is the same; I think therefore that it will be in place
here to try and make my readers understand, as far as words
can do so, the Roman tactics in regard to the march (
agmen),
the camp (
castrorum metatio), and the line of battle (
acies). I
cannot imagine any one so indifferent to things noble and,
great, as to refuse to take some little extra trouble to understand things like these; for if he has once heard them, he will
be acquainted with one of those things genuinely worth observation and knowledge.
How the Camp is Constructed
Their method of laying out a camp is as follows. The
place for the camp having been selected,
the spot in it best calculated to give a view
of the whole, and most convenient for issuing
orders, is appropriated for the general's tent (
Praetorium).
Having placed a standard on the spot on which they intend
to put the Praetorium, they measure off a square round this
standard; in such a way that each of its sides is a hundred feet
from the standard, and the area of the square is four plethra.
8
Along one side of this square—whichever aspect appears
most convenient for watering and foraging—the legions are
stationed as follows. I have said that there were six Tribuni
in each legion, and that each Consul had two legions,—it
follows that there are twelve
Tribuni in a Consular army. Well,
they pitch the tents of these Tribuni all in one straight line,
parallel to the side of the square selected, at a distance of fifty
feet from it (there is a place too selected for the horses,
beasts of burden, and other baggage of the Tribuni); these
tents face the outer side of the camp and away from the square
described above,—a direction which will henceforth be called
"the front" by me. The tents of the Tribuni stand at equal
distances from each other, so that they extend along the whole
breadth of the space occupied by the legions.
Division by Roads and Squares
From the line described by the front of these tents
they measure another distance of a hundred
feet towards the front. At that distance another
parallel straight line is drawn, and it is from this last that they
begin arranging the quarters of the legions, which they do as
follows:—they bisect the last mentioned straight line, and
from that point draw another straight line at right angles
to it; along this line, on either side of it facing
each other, the cavalry of the two legions are
quartered with a space of fifty feet between them, which space
is exactly bisected by the line last mentioned.
The manner
of encamping the infantry is similar to that of the cavalry.
The whole area of each space occupied by the maniples and
squadrons is a square, and faces the
via;9 the length facing
the
via is one hundred feet, and they generally try to make the
depth the same, except in the case of the socii; and when they
are employing legions of an extra number, they increase the
length and depth of these squares proportionally.
The spaces assigned to the cavalry are opposite the
space between the two groups of tents belonging to the Tribuni
of the two legions, at right angles to the line along which they
stand, like a cross-road; and indeed the whole arrangement
of the
viae is like a system of cross-roads, running on either side
of the blocks of tents, those of the cavalry on one side and those
of the infantry on the other. The spaces assigned to the
cavalry and the Triarii in each legion are back to back, with no
via between them, but touching each other, looking opposite
ways; and the depth of the spaces assigned to the Triarii is
only half that assigned to other maniples, because their
numbers are generally only half; but though the number of
the men is different, the length of the space is always the same
owing to the lesser depth. Next, parallel with these spaces, at
a distance of fifty feet, they place the
Principes facing the
Triarii; and as they face the space between themselves and
the
Triarii, we have two more roads formed at right angles
to the hundred-foot area in front of the tents of the Tribunes,
and running down from it to the outer agger of the camp on the
side opposite to that of the Principia, which we agreed to call
the front of the camp. Behind the spaces for the
Triarii and
looking in the opposite direction, and touching each other, are
the spaces for the
Hastati. These several branches of the
service (
Triarii, Principes, Hastati), being each divided into
ten maniples, the cross-roads between the blocks are all the
same length and terminate in the front agger of the camp;
towards which they cause the last maniples in the rows to face.
Placement of the Allies
Beyond the
Hastati they again leave a space of fifty
feet, and there, beginning from the same base (the Principia),
and going in a parallel direction, and to the same distance
as the other blocks, they place the cavalry of the allies facing
the
Hastati. Now the number of the allies, as I have stated
above, is equal to that of the legions in regard to the infantry,
though it falls below that if we omit the
extraordinarii; but
that of the cavalry is double, when the third part is deducted
for service among the
extraordinarii. Therefore in marking
out the camp the spaces assigned to the latter are made proportionally deeper, so that their length remains the same as
those occupied by the legions. Thus five viae are formed:
10
and back to back with these cavalry are the spaces for the
infantry of the allies, the depth being proportionally increased
according to their numbers;
11 and these maniples face the outer
sides of the camp and the agger. In each maniple the first
tent at either end is occupied by the centurions.
Between
the fifth and sixth squadrons of cavalry, and the
fifth and sixth maniple of infantry, there is a
space of fifty left, so that another road is made across the
camp at right angles to the others and parallel to the tents
of the Tribuni, and this they call the
Via Quintana, as it runs
along the fifth squadrons and maniples.
The Camp Market-Place
The space behind the tents of the Tribuni is thus
The space between the Principia and the agger. |
used. On one side of the square of the Praetorium is the market, on the other the office of
the Quaestor and the supplies which he has
charge of. Then behind the last tent of the Tribuni on
either side, arranged at right angles to those tents, are the
quarters of the cavalry picked out of the
extraordinarii, as
well as of some of those who are serving as
volunteers from personal friendship to the
Consuls.
The Staff, or Praetoria cohors. |
All these are arranged parallel to
the side aggers, facing on the one side the Quaestorium, on
the other the market-place. And, generally speaking, it falls
to the lot of these men not only to be near the Consul in the
camp, but to be wholly employed about the persons of the
Consul and the Quaestor on the march and all other occasions.
Back to back with these again, facing the agger, are placed
the infantry who serve in the same way as these cavalry.
12
Beyond these there is another empty space or road left,
one hundred feet broad, parallel to the tents of the Tribuni,
skirting the market-place, Praetorium, and Quaestorium, from
agger to agger. On the further side of this road the rest of
the
equites extraordinarii are placed facing the market-place
and Quaestorium: and between the quarters of these cavalry
of the two legions a passage is left of fifty feet, exactly opposite
and at right angles to the square of the Praetorium, leading
to the rearward agger.
Back to back with the
equites extraordinarii are the infantry
of the same, facing the agger at the rear of the whole camp.
And the space left empty on either side of these, facing the
agger on each side of the camp, is given up to foreigners and
such allies as chance to come to the camp.
The result of these arrangements is that the whole camp is
The space round the quarters. |
a square, with streets and other constructions
regularly planned like a town. Between the line
of the tents and the agger there is an empty space
of two hundred feet on every side of the square, which is turned
to a great variety of uses. To begin with, it is exceedingly convenient for the marching in and out of the legions. For each
division descends into this space by the
via which passes its own
quarters, and so avoids crowding and hustling each other, as
they would if they were all collected on one road. Again, all
cattle brought into the camp, as well as booty of all sorts taken
from the enemy, are deposited in this space and securely
guarded during the night-watches. But the most important
use of this space is that, in night assaults, it secures the tents
from the danger of being set on fire, and keeps the soldiers
out of the range of the enemy's missiles; or, if a few of them
do carry so far, they are spent and cannot penetrate the tents.
Arrangements When There Are More Men
The number then of foot-soldiers and cavalry being
Provision for extra numbers. |
given (at the rate, that is to say, of four
thousand or of five thousand for each legion),
and the length, depth, and number of the
maniples being likewise known, as well as the breadth of
the passages and roads, it becomes possible to calculate
the area occupied by the camp and the length of the
aggers. If on any occasion the number of allies, either
those originally enrolled or those who joined subsequently,
exceeds their due proportion, the difficulty is provided for
in this way. To the overplus of allies who joined subsequent
to the enrolment of the army are assigned the spaces on either
side of the Praetorium, the market-place and Quaestorium being proportionally contracted. For the extra numbers of allies
who joined originally an extra line of tents (forming thus another
via) is put up parallel with the other tents of the socii,
facing the agger on either side of the camp.
and for two consular armies. |
But if all four
legions and both Consuls are in the same
camp, all we have to do is to imagine a second
army, arranged back to back to the one
already placed, in exactly the same spaces as the former,
but side by side with it at the part where the picked men
from the
extraordinarii are stationed facing the rearward agger.
In this case the shape of the camp becomes an oblong, the
area double, and the length of the entire agger half as much
again. This is the arrangement when both Consuls are within
the same agger; but if they occupy two separate camps, the
above arrangements hold good, except that the market-place is
placed half way between the two camps.
Guard Duty and Other Assignments
The camp having thus been laid out, the Tribuni
next administer an oath to all in it separately,
whether free or slave, that they will steal
nothing within the agger, and in case they find anything will
bring it to the Tribuni. They next select for their several
duties the maniples of the Principes and Hastati in each
legion. Two are told off to guard the space in front of the
quarters of the Tribuni. For in this space, which is called the
Principia, most of the Romans in the camp transact all the
business of the day; and are therefore very particular about its
being kept well watered and properly swept. Of the other
eighteen maniples, three are assigned to each of the six Tribuni,
that being the respective numbers in each legion; and of these
three maniples each takes its turn of duty in waiting upon the
Tribune. The services they render him are such as these:
they pitch his tent for him when a place is selected for
encampment, and level the ground all round it; and if any
extra precaution is required for the protection of his baggage,
it is their duty to see to it. They also supply him with two
relays of guards. A guard consists of four men, two of whom
act as sentries in front of his tent, and two on the rear of it
near the horses. Seeing that each Tribune has three maniples,
and each maniple has a hundred men, without counting
Triarii
and
Velites who are not liable for this service, the duty is a
light one, coming round to each maniple only once in three
days; while by this arrangement ample provision is made for
the convenience as well as the dignity of the Tribuni. The
maniples of Triarii are exempted from this personal service to
the Tribuni, but they each supply a watch of four men to the
squadron of cavalry nearest them. These watches have to
keep a general look out; but their chief duty is to keep an eye
upon the horses, to prevent their hurting themselves by getting
entangled in their tethers, and so becoming unfit for use; or
from getting loose, and making a confusion and disturbance in
the camp by running against other horses. Finally, all the
maniples take turns to mount guard for a day each at the
Consul's tent, to protect him from plots, and maintain the
dignity of his office.
Daily Orders and Watchwords
As to the construction of the foss and vallum,
13 two
sides fall to the lot of the socii, each division
taking that side along which it is quartered;
the other two are left to the Romans, one
to each legion. Each side is divided into portions according to the number of maniples, and the centurions stand
by and superintend the work of each maniple; while two
of the Tribunes superintend the construction of the whole
side and see that it is adequate. In the same way the
Tribunes superintend all other operations in the camp. They
divide themselves in twos, and each pair is on duty for two
months out of six; they draw lots for their turns, and the pair
on whom the lot falls takes the superintendence of all active
operations. The prefects of the socii divide their duty in the
same way.
At daybreak the officers of the
cavalry and the centurions muster at the tents
of the Tribunes, while the Tribunes go to that
of the Consul. He gives the necessary orders to the Tribunes,
they to the cavalry officers and centurions, and these last pass
them on to the rank and file as occasion may demand.
To secure the passing round of the watchword for the
night the following course is followed. One
man is selected from the tenth maniple,
which, in the case both of cavalry and infantry, is quartered at the ends of the road between the tents; this
man is relieved from guard-duty and appears each day
about sunset at the tent of the Tribune on duty, takes the
tessera or wooden tablet on which the watchword is inscribed,
and returns to his own maniple and delivers the wooden tablet
and watchword in the presence of witnesses to the chief
officer of the maniple next his own; he in the same way to
the officer of the next, and so on, until it arrives at the first
maniple stationed next the Tribunes. These men are
obliged to deliver the tablet (
tessera) to the Tribunes before
dark. If they are all handed in, the Tribune knows that the
watchword has been delivered to all, and has passed through
all the ranks back to his hands: but if any one is missing, he
at once investigates the matter; for he knows by the marks on
the tablets from which division of the army the tablet has not
appeared; and the man who is discovered to be responsible
for its non-appearance is visited with condign punishment.
Night Watches
Next as to the keeping guard at night. The
Consul's tent is guarded by the maniple
on duty: those of the Tribuni and praefects
of the cavalry by the pickets formed as described above
from the several maniples. And in the same way each
maniple and squadron posts guards of their own men. The
other pickets are posted by the Consul. Generally speaking
there are three pickets at the Quaestorium, and two at the
tent of each of the legati or members of council. The vallum
is lined by the
velites, who are on guard all along it from
day to day. That is their special duty; while they also guard
all the entrances to the camp, telling off ten sentinels to take
their turn at each of them. Of the men told off for duty at the
several
stationes, the man who in each maniple is to take the
first watch is brought by the rear-rank man of his company to
the Tribune at eventide. The latter hands over to them
severally small wooden tablets (
tesserae), one for each watch,
inscribed with small marks; on receiving which they go off to
the places indicated.
The duty of going the rounds is intrusted to the cavalry.
The first Praefect of cavalry in each legion, early
in the morning, orders one of his rear-rank men
to give notice before breakfast to four young men of his squadron
who are to go the rounds. At evening this same man's duty
is to give notice to the Praefect of the next squadron that it is
his turn to provide for going the rounds until next morning.
This officer thereupon takes measures similar to the preceding
one until the next day; and so on throughout the cavalry
squadrons. The four men thus selected by the rear-rank men
from the first squadron, after drawing lots for the watch they
are to take, proceed to the tent of the Tribune on duty, and
receive from him a writing stating the order
14 and the number
of the watches they are to visit. The four then take up their
quarters for the night alongside of the first maniple of
Triarii; for it is the duty of the centurion of this maniple to
see that a bugle is blown at the beginning of every watch.
When the time has arrived, the man to whose lot the first
watch has fallen goes his rounds, taking some of his friends as
witnesses. He walks through the posts assigned, which are
not only those along the vallum and gates, but also the
pickets set by the several maniples and squadrons. If he
find the men of the first watch awake he takes from them their
tessera; but if he find any one of them asleep or absent from
his post, he calls those with him to witness the fact and passes
on. The same process is repeated by those who go the
rounds during the other watches. The charge of seeing that
the bugle is blown at the beginning of each watch, so that the
right man might visit the right pickets, is as I have said, laid
upon the centurions of the first maniple of Triarii, each one
taking the duty for a day.
Each of these men who have gone the rounds (
tessarii) at
daybreak conveys the tesserae to the Tribune on duty. If the
whole number are given in they are dismissed without
question; but if any of them brings a number less than that
of the pickets, an investigation is made by means of the mark
on the tessera, as to which picket he has omitted. Upon this
being ascertained the centurion is summoned; he brings the
men who were on duty, and they are confronted with the
patrol. If the fault is with the men on guard, the patrol
clears himself by producing the witnesses whom he took with
him; for he cannot do so without. If nothing of that sort
happened, the blame recoils upon the patrol.
The Tribunes' Court
Then the Tribunes at once hold a court-martial,
and the man who is found guilty is punished
by the
fustuarium; the nature of which is
this. The Tribune takes a cudgel and merely
touches the condemned man; whereupon all the soldiers
fall upon him with cudgels and stones. Generally speaking men thus punished are killed on the spot; but if
by any chance, after running the gauntlet, they manage
to escape from the camp, they have no hope of ultimately
surviving even so. They may not return to their own country,
nor would any one venture to receive such an one into his
house. Therefore those who have once fallen into this
misfortune are utterly and finally ruined. The same fate
awaits the praefect of the squadron, as well as his rear-rank
man, if they fail to give the necessary order at the proper time,
the latter to the patrols, and the former to the praefect of the
next squadron. The result of the severity and inevitableness of this punishment is that in the Roman army the night
watches are faultlessly kept. The common soldiers are
amenable to the Tribunes; the Tribunes to the Consuls.
The Tribune is competent to punish a soldier by inflicting a
fine, distraining his goods, or ordering him to be flogged; so too
the praefects in the case of the socii. The punishment of the
fustuarium is assigned also to any one committing theft in
the camp, or bearing false witness: as also to any one who in
full manhood is detected in shameful immorality: or to any
one who has been thrice punished for the same offence. All
these things are punished as crimes. But such as the following are reckoned as cowardly and dishonourable in a soldier:
—for a man to make a false report to the Tribunes of his
valour in order to get reward; or for men who have been
told off to an ambuscade to quit the place assigned them from
fear; and also for a man to throw away any of his arms from
fear, on the actual field of battle. Consequently it sometimes
happens that men confront certain death at their stations, because, from their fear of the punishment awaiting them at
home, they refuse to quit their post: while others, who have
lost shield or spear or any other arm on the field, throw themselves upon the foe, in hopes of recovering what they have lost,
or of escaping by death from certain disgrace and the insults
of their relations.
15
Military Punishments and Rewards
But if it ever happens that a number of men are
involved in these same acts: if, for instance,
some entire maniples have quitted their ground
in the presence of the enemy, it is deemed impossible to
subject all to the
fustuarium or to military execution;
but a solution of the difficulty has been found at once
adequate to the maintenance of discipline and calculated
to strike terror. The Tribune assembles the legion, calls
the defaulters to the front, and, after administering a sharp
rebuke, selects five or eight or twenty out of them by lot,
so that those selected should be about a tenth of those who
have been guilty of the act of cowardice. These selected
are punished with the
fustuarium without mercy; the rest are
put on rations of barley instead of wheat, and are ordered to
take up their quarters outside the vallum and the protection of
the camp. As all are equally in danger of having the lot fall
on them, and as all alike who escape that, are made a conspicuous example of by having their rations of barley, the best
possible means are thus taken to inspire fear for the future,
and to correct the mischief which has actually occurred.
Military Decorations
A very excellent plan also is adopted for inducing
young soldiers to brave danger. When an
engagement has taken place and any of them
have showed conspicuous gallantry, the Consul
summons an assembly of the legion, puts forward those
whom he considers to have distinguished themselves in any
way, and first compliments each of them individually on his
gallantry, and mentions any other distinction he may have
earned in the course of his life, and then presents them with
gifts: to the man who has wounded an enemy, a spear; to
the man who has killed one and stripped his armour, a cup,
if he be in the infantry, horse-trappings if in the cavalry:
though originally the only present made was a spear. This
does not take place in the event of their having wounded or
stripped any of the enemy in a set engagement or the storming of a town; but in skirmishes or other occasions of that
sort, in which, without there being any positive necessity for
them to expose themselves singly to danger, they have done
so voluntarily and deliberately. In the capture of a town
those who are first to mount the walls are presented with a gold crown.
So too those who
have covered and saved any citizens or allies are distinguished
by the Consul with certain presents; and those whom they
have preserved present them voluntarily with a
crown, or if not, they are compelled to do so
by the Tribunes.
The man thus preserved, too, reverences
his preserver throughout his life as a father, and is bound to
act towards him as a father in every respect. By such incentives those who stay at home are stirred up to a noble
rivalry and emulation in confronting danger, no less than those
who actually hear and see what takes place. For the recipients of such rewards not only enjoy great glory among
their comrades in the army, and an immediate reputation at
home, but after their return they are marked men in all
solemn festivals; for they alone, who have been thus distinguished by the Consuls for bravery, are allowed to wear
robes of honour on those occasions: and moreover they place
the spoils they have taken in the most conspicuous places in
their houses, as visible tokens and proofs of their valour. No
wonder that a people, whose rewards and punishments are
allotted with such care and received with such feelings, should
be brilliantly successful in war.
The pay of the foot soldier is 5 1/3 asses a day; of the
centurion 10 2/3; of the cavalry 16. The infantry receive a
ration of wheat equal to about 2/3 of an Attic medimnus a
month, and the cavalry 7 medimni of barley, and 2 of wheat;
of the allies the infantry receive the same, the cavalry 1 1/3
medimnus of wheat, and 5 of barley. This is a free gift to
the allies; but in the cases of the Romans, the Quaestor stops
out of their pay the price of their corn and clothes, or any
additional arms they may require at a fixed rate.
The Army On the March
The following is their manner of moving camp. At
the first bugle the men all strike their tents and collect their
baggage; but no soldier may strike his tent, or set it up either,
till the same is done to that of the Tribuni and the Consul.
At the second bugle they load the beasts of burden with their
baggage: at the third the first maniples must advance and
set the whole camp in motion. Generally speaking, the men
appointed to make this start are the
extraordinarii: next comes
the right wing of the socii; and behind them their beasts of
burden. These are followed by the first legion with its own
baggage immediately on its rear; then comes the second
legion, followed by its own beasts of burden, and the baggage
of those socii who have to bring up the rear of the march,
that is to say, the left wing of the socii. The cavalry sometimes ride on the rear of their respective divisions, sometimes
on either side of the beasts of burden, to keep them together
and secure them. If an attack is expected on the rear, the
extraordinarii themselves occupy the rear instead of the
van. Of the two legions and wings each takes the lead in
the march on alternate days, that by this interchange of position all may have an equal share in the advantage of being
first at the water and forage. The order of march, however,
is different at times of unusual danger, if they have open ground
enough. For in that case they advance in three parallel
columns, consisting of the
Hastati, Principes, and
Triarii: the
beasts of burden belonging to the maniples in the van are placed
in front of all, those belonging to the second behind the leading maniples, and those belonging to the third behind the second
maniples, thus having the baggage and the maniples in alternate
lines. With this order of march, on an alarm being given, the
columns face to the right or left according to the quarter on
which the enemy appears, and get clear of the baggage. So
that in a short space of time, and by one movement, the whole
of the hoplites are in line of battle—except that sometimes it
is necessary to half-wheel the
Hastati also—and the baggage
and the rest of the army are in their proper place for safety,
namely, in the rear of the line of combatants.
Making Camp
When the army on the march is approaching the
place of encampment, a Tribune, and those
of the centurions who have been from time
to time selected for that duty, are sent
forward to survey the place of encampment. Having done
this they proceed first of all to fix upon the place for the Consul's tent (as I have described above), and to determine on
which side of the Praetorium to quarter the legions. Having
decided these points they measure out the Praetorium, then
they draw the straight line along which the tents of the Tribunes
are to be pitched, and then the line parallel to this, beyond
which the quarters of the legions are to begin. In the same
way they draw the lines on the other sides of the Praetorium
in accordance with the plan which I have already detailed at
length. This does not take long, nor is the marking out of
the camp a matter of difficulty, because the dimensions are all
regularly laid down, and are in accordance with precedent.
Then they fix one flag in the ground where the Consul's tent
is to stand, and another on the base of the square containing
it, and a third on the line of the Tribunes' tents; the two latter
are scarlet, that which marks the Consul's tent is white; the
lines on the other sides of the Praetorium are marked sometimes with plain spears and sometimes by flags of other colours.
After this they lay out the
viae between the quarters, fixing
spears at each
via. Consequently when the legions in the
course of their march have come near enough to get a clear
view of the place of encampment, they can all make out
exactly the whole plan of it, taking as their base the Consul's
flag and calculating from that. Moreover as each soldier
knows precisely on which
via, and at what point of it, his
quarters are to be, because all occupy the same position in
the camp wherever it may be, it is exactly like a legion entering
its own city; when breaking off at the gates each man makes
straight for his own residence without hesitation, because he
knows the direction and the quarter of the town in which
home lies. It is precisely the same in a Roman camp.
Roman Camps Designed for Facility and Familiarity
It is because the first object of the Romans in the
matter of encampment is facility, that they seem to me to
differ diametrically from Greek military men in this respect.
Greeks, in choosing a place for a camp, think primarily of
security from the natural strength of the position: first, because
they are averse from the toil of digging a foss, and, secondly,
because they think that no artificial defences are comparable
to those afforded by the nature of the ground. Accordingly,
they not only have to vary the whole configuration of the camp
to suit the nature of the ground, but to change the arrangement of details in all kinds of irregular ways; so that neither
soldier nor company has a fixed place in it. The Romans, on
the other hand, prefer to undergo the fatigue of digging, and
of the other labours of circumvallation, for the sake of the
facility in arrangement, and to secure a plan of encampment
which shall be one and the same and familiar to all.
Such are the most important facts in regard to the legions
and the method of encamping them. . . .
The Roman Republic Compared with Others
Nearly all historians have recorded as constitutions
The Theban constitution may be put aside. |
of eminent excellence those of Lacedaemonia,
Crete,
Mantinea, and
Carthage. Some have
also mentioned those of
Athens and
Thebes.
The former I may allow to pass; but I am convinced that
little need be said of the Athenian and Theban constitutions: their growth was abnormal, the period of their
zenith brief, and the changes they experienced unusually
violent. Their glory was a sudden and fortuitous flash, so to
speak; and while they still thought themselves prosperous, and
likely to remain so, they found themselves involved in
circumstances completely the reverse. The Thebans got their
reputation for valour among the Greeks, by taking advantage
of the senseless policy of the Lacedaemonians, and the hatred
of the allies towards them, owing to the valour of one, or at
most two, men who were wise enough to appreciate the
situation. Since fortune quickly made it evident that it was
not the peculiarity of their constitution, but the valour of
their leaders, which gave the Thebans their success. For the
great power of
Thebes notoriously took its rise, attained its
zenith, and fell to the ground with the lives of Epaminondas
and Pelopidas. We must therefore conclude that it was not
its constitution, but its men, that caused the high fortune
which it then enjoyed.
The Athenian Constitution
A somewhat similar remark applies to the Athenian
The Athenian constitution may be put aside. |
constitution also. For though it perhaps had
more frequent interludes of excellence, yet
its highest perfection was attained during the
brilliant career of Themistocles; and having reached that
point it quickly declined, owing to its essential instability.
For the Athenian demus is always in the position of a ship
without a commander. In such a ship, if fear of the enemy,
or the occurrence of a storm induce the crew to be of one mind
and to obey the helmsman, everything goes well; but if they
recover from this fear, and begin to treat their officers with
contempt, and to quarrel with each other because they are no
longer all of one mind,—one party wishing to continue the
voyage, and the other urging the steersman to bring the ship
to anchor; some letting out the sheets, and others hauling
them in, and ordering the sails to be furled,—their discord and
quarrels make a sorry show to lookers on; and the position of
affairs is full of risk to those on board engaged on the same
voyage: and the result has often been that, after escaping the
dangers of the widest seas, and the most violent storms, they
wreck their ship in harbour and close to shore. And this is what
has often happened to the Athenian constitution. For, after
repelling, on various occasions, the greatest and most formidable
dangers by the valour of its people and their leaders, there
have been times when, in periods of secure tranquillity, it has
gratuitously and recklessly encountered disaster.
16 Therefore I
need say no more about either it, or the Theban constitution: in
both of which a mob manages everything on its own unfettered
impulse—a mob in the one city distinguished for headlong outbursts of fiery temper, in the other trained in long habits of
violence and ferocity.
The Cretan Constitution Compared to the Spartan
Passing to the Cretan polity there are two points
The Spartan polity unlike that of Crete. |
which deserve our consideration. The first
is how such writers as Ephorus, Xenophon,
Callisthenes and Plato
17—who are the most
learned of the ancients—could assert that it was like that
of
Sparta; and secondly how they came to assert that it was
at all admirable. I can agree with neither assertion; and
I will explain why I say so. And first as to its dissimilarity
with the Spartan constitution. The peculiar merit of the latter
is said to be its land laws, by which no one possesses more than
another, but all citizens have an equal share in the public
land.
18
The next distinctive feature regards the possession of
money: for as it is utterly discredited among them, the
jealous competition which arises from inequality of wealth is
entirely removed from the city. A third peculiarity of the
Lacedaemonian polity is that, of the officials by whose hands
and with whose advice the whole government is conducted,
the kings hold an hereditary office, while the members of the
Gerusia are elected for life.
Greed Among the Cretans
Among the Cretans the exact reverse of all these arrangements
obtains. The laws allow them to possess as much land
as they can get with no limitation whatever. Money is so
highly valued among them, that its possession is not only
thought to be necessary but in the highest degree creditable.
And in fact greed and avarice are so native to the soil in
Crete, that they are the only people in the world among whom
no stigma attaches to any sort of gain whatever. Again all
their offices are annual and on a democratical footing. I have
therefore often felt at a loss to account for these writers
speaking of the two constitutions, which are radically different,
as though they were closely united and allied. But, besides
overlooking these important differences, these writers have
gone out of their way to comment at length on the legislation
of Lycurgus: "He was the only legislator," they say, "who
saw the important points. For there being two things on
which the safety of a commonwealth depends,—courage in
the face of the enemy and concord at home,—by abolishing
covetousness, he with it removed all motive for civil broil and
contest: whence it has been brought about that the Lacedaemonians are the best governed and most united people in
Greece." Yet while giving utterance to these sentiments, and
though they see that, in contrast to this, the Cretans by their
ingrained avarice are engaged in countless public and private
seditions, murders and civil wars, they yet regard these facts as
not affecting their contention, but are bold enough to speak of
the two constitutions as alike. Ephorus, indeed, putting aside
names, employs expressions so precisely the same, when discoursing on the two constitutions, that, unless one noticed the
proper names, there would be no means whatever of distinguishing which of the two he was describing.
What Makes a Constitution Good
In what the difference between them consists I have
already stated. I will now address myself to showing that the
Cretan constitution deserves neither praise nor imitation.
To my mind, then, there are two things fundamental
to every state, in virtue of which its powers
and constitution become desirable or objectionable. These are customs and laws.
Of these the desirable are those which make men's private
lives holy and pure, and the public character of the state
civilised and just. The objectionable are those whose effect
is the reverse. As, then, when we see good customs
and good laws prevailing among certain people, we confidently assume that, in consequence of them, the men and
their civil constitution will be good also, so when we see
private life full of covetousness, and public policy of injustice,
plainly we have reason for asserting their laws, particular customs, and general constitution
to be bad. Now, with few exceptions, you could find no habits prevailing in private life more
steeped in treachery than those in
Crete, and no public policy
more inequitable. Holding, then, the Cretan constitution to
be neither like the Spartan, nor worthy of choice or imitation,
I reject it from the comparison which I have instituted.
Nor again would it be fair to introduce the Republic
Ideal polities may be omitted. |
of Plato, which is also spoken of in high
terms by some philosophers. For just as we
refuse admission to the athletic contests
to those actors or athletes who have not acquired a
recognised position
19 or trained for them, so we ought not to
admit this Platonic constitution to the contest for the prize
of merit unless it can first point to some genuine and practical
achievement. Up to this time the notion of bringing it into
comparison with the constitutions of
Sparta,
Rome, and
Carthage would be like putting up a statue to compare with living
and breathing men. Even if such a statue were faultless in
point of art, the comparison of the lifeless with the living
would naturally leave an impression of imperfection and incongruity upon the minds of the spectators.
Institutions of Lycurgus
I shall therefore omit these, and proceed with my
description of the Laconian constitution. Now
it seems to me that for securing unity among
the citizens, for safe-guarding the Laconian
territory, and preserving the liberty of
Sparta inviolate,
the legislation and provisions of Lycurgus were so excellent, that I am forced to regard his wisdom as something
superhuman. For the equality of landed possessions, the
simplicity in their food, and the practice of taking it in common,
which he established, were well calculated to secure morality
in private life and to prevent civil broils in the State; as also
their training in the endurance of labours and dangers to make
men brave and noble minded: but when both these virtues,
courage and high morality, are combined in one soul or in one
state, vice will not readily spring from such a soil, nor will
such men easily be overcome by their enemies. By constructing his constitution therefore in this spirit, and of these
elements, he secured two blessings to the Spartans,—safety for
their territory, and a lasting freedom for themselves long after he
was gone. He appears however to have made no one provision
whatever, particular or general, for the acquisition of the territory
of their neighbours; or for the assertion of their supremacy; or,
in a word, for any policy of aggrandisement at all. What he
had still to do was to impose such a necessity, or create such a
spirit among the citizens, that, as he had succeeded in making
their individual lives independent and simple, the public
character of the state should also become independent and
moral. But the actual fact is, that, though he made them the
most disinterested and sober-minded men in
the world, as far as their own ways of life and
their national institutions were concerned, he
left them in regard to the rest of
Greece ambitious, eager for
supremacy, and encroaching in the highest degree.
The Defect in the Spartan Constitution
For in the first place is it not notorious that they
First and second Messenian wars, B. C. 745-724(?), 685-668. |
were nearly the first Greeks to cast a covetous eye upon the territory of their neighbours, and that accordingly they waged a
war of subjugation on the Messenians?
In the next place is it not related in all histories that in
their dogged obstinacy they bound themselves with an oath
never to desist from the siege of
Messene until they
had taken it? And lastly it is known to all that in their
efforts for supremacy in
Greece they submitted to do
the bidding of those whom they had once conquered in
war.
For when the Persians invaded
Greece,
they conquered them, as champions of the
liberty of the Greeks; yet when the invaders
had retired and fled, they betrayed the cities of
Greece into
their hands by the peace of Antalcidas, for the
sake of getting money to secure their supremacy
over the Greeks.
Peace of Antalcidas, B. C. 387. |
It was then that the defect
in their constitution was rendered apparent.
The causes of this failure. |
For as long as
their ambition was confined to governing their
immediate neighbours, or even the Peloponnesians only, they were content with the
resources and supplies provided by
Laconia itself, having all
material of war ready to hand, and being able without much
expenditure of time to return home or convey provisions with
them. But directly they took in hand to despatch naval
expeditions, or to go on campaigns by land outside the
Peloponnese, it was evident that neither their iron currency, nor
their use of crops for payment in kind, would be able to
supply them with what they lacked if they abided by the
legislation of Lycurgus; for such undertakings required money
universally current, and goods from foreign countries. Thus
they were compelled to wait humbly at Persian doors, impose
tribute on the islanders, and exact contributions from all the
Greeks: knowing that, if they abided by the laws of Lycurgus,
it was impossible to advance any claims upon any outside power
at all, much less upon the supremacy in
Greece.
Sparta Compared with Rome
My object, then, in this digression is to make it
manifest by actual facts that, for guarding
their own country with absolute safety, and
for preserving their own freedom, the legislation of Lycurgus was entirely sufficient; and for those who
are content with these objects we must concede that there
neither exists, nor ever has existed, a constitution and civil order
preferable to that of
Sparta. But if any one is seeking
aggrandisement, and believes that to be a leader and ruler and
despot of numerous subjects, and to have all looking and
turning to him, is a finer thing than that,—in this point of
view we must acknowledge that the Spartan constitution is
deficient, and that of
Rome superior and better constituted for
obtaining power. And this has been proved by actual facts.
For when the Lacedaemonians strove to possess themselves of
the supremacy in
Greece, it was not long before they brought
their own freedom itself into danger. Whereas the Romans,
after obtaining supreme power over the Italians themselves, soon
brought the whole world under their rule,—in which achievement the abundance and availability of their supplies largely
contributed to their success.
Carthage Compared with Rome
Now the Carthaginian constitution seems to me
originally to have been well contrived in
these most distinctively important particulars. For they had
kings,
20 and the Gerusia
had the powers of an aristocracy, and the multitude were
supreme in such things as affected them; and on the whole
the adjustment of its several parts was very like that of
Rome
and
Sparta. But about the period of its entering on the
Hannibalian war the political state of
Carthage was on the
decline,
21 that of
Rome improving. For whereas there is in
every body, or polity, or business a natural stage of growth,
zenith, and decay; and whereas everything in them is at its
best at the zenith; we may thereby judge of the difference between these two constitutions as they existed at that period.
For exactly so far as the strength and prosperity of
Carthage
preceded that of
Rome in point of time, by so much was
Carthage then past its prime, while
Rome was exactly at its
zenith, as far as its political constitution was concerned. In
Carthage therefore the influence of the people in the policy
of the state had already risen to be supreme, while at
Rome
the Senate was at the height of its power: and so, as in the
one measures were deliberated upon by the many, in the
other by the best men, the policy of the Romans in
all public undertakings proved the stronger; on which
account, though they met with capital disasters, by force of
prudent counsels they finally conquered the Carthaginians in
the war.
The Causes of Roman Superiority
If we look however at separate details, for instance
and its citizen levies superior to Carthaginian mercenaries. |
at the provisions for carrying on a war, we
shall find that whereas for a naval expedition
the Carthaginians are the better trained and
prepared,—as it is only natural with a people
with whom it has been hereditary for many generations to
practise this craft, and to follow the seaman's trade above all
nations in the world,—yet, in regard to military service on
land, the Romans train themselves to a much higher pitch
than the Carthaginians. The former bestow their whole
attention upon this department: whereas the Carthaginians
wholly neglect their infantry, though they do take some slight
interest in the cavalry. The reason of this is that they employ
foreign mercenaries, the Romans native and citizen levies. It
is in this point that the latter polity is preferable to the
former. They have their hopes of freedom ever resting on the
courage of mercenary troops: the Romans on the valour of their
own citizens and the aid of their allies. The result is that even
if the Romans have suffered a defeat at first, they renew the war
with undiminished forces, which the Carthaginians cannot do.
For, as the Romans are fighting for country and children, it is
impossible for them to relax the fury of their struggle; but
they persist with obstinate resolution until they have overcome their enemies. What has happened in regard to their
navy is an instance in point. In skill the Romans are much
behind the Carthaginians, as I have already said; yet the upshot of the whole naval war has been a decided triumph for
the Romans, owing to the valour of their men. For although
nautical science contributes largely to success in sea-fights,
still it is the courage of the marines that turns the scale most
decisively in favour of victory. The fact is that Italians as a
nation are by nature superior to Phoenicians and Libyans both
in physical strength and courage; but still their habits also do
much to inspire the youth with enthusiasm for such exploits.
One example will be sufficient of the pains taken by the
Roman state to turn out men ready to endure anything to win
a reputation in their country for valour.
Roman Funeral Rites
Whenever one of their illustrious men dies, in the
course of his funeral, the body with all its
paraphernalia is carried into the forum to the
Rostra, as a raised platform there is called,
and sometimes is propped upright upon it so as to be
conspicuous, or, more rarely, is laid upon it. Then with all
the people standing round, his son, if he has left one of full
age and he is there, or, failing him, one of his relations, mounts
the Rostra and delivers a speech concerning the virtues of the
deceased, and the successful exploits performed by him in his
lifetime.
By these means the people are reminded of what
has been done, and made to see it with their own eyes,—not
only such as were engaged in the actual
transactions but those also who were not;—
and their sympathies are so deeply moved, that the loss
appears not to be confined to the actual mourners, but to be
a public one affecting the whole people. After the burial
and all the usual ceremonies have been performed, they place
the likeness of the deceased in the most conspicuous spot in
his house, surmounted by a wooden canopy or shrine. This
likeness consists of a mask made to represent the deceased
with extraordinary fidelity both in shape and colour. These
likenesses they display at public sacrifices adorned with much
care. And when any illustrious member of the family dies,
they carry these masks to the funeral, putting them on men
whom they thought as like the originals as possible in height
and other personal peculiarities. And these substitutes assume
clothes according to the rank of the person represented: if he
was a consul or praetor, a toga with purple
stripes; if a censor, whole purple
22 if he had also
celebrated a triumph or performed any exploit
of that kind, a toga embroidered with gold.
Toga praetexta, purpurea, picta. |
These representatives also ride themselves in chariots, while
the fasces and axes, and all the other customary insignia of the
particular offices, lead the way, according to the dignity of the
rank in the state enjoyed by the deceased in his lifetime;
and on arriving at the Rostra they all take
their seats on ivory chairs in their order.
There could not easily be a more inspiring spectacle than this
for a young man of noble ambitions and virtuous aspirations.
For can we conceive any one to be unmoved at the sight of
all the likenesses collected together of the men who have
earned glory, all as it were living and breathing? Or what
could be a more glorious spectacle?
The Glorious Memory of Brave Men Kept Alive
Besides the speaker over the body about to be buried,
Devotion of the citizens. |
after having finished the panegyric of this
particular person, starts upon the others whose
representatives are present, beginning with the
most ancient, and recounts the successes and achievements
of each. By this means the glorious memory of brave
men is continually renewed; the fame of those who have
performed any noble deed is never allowed to die; and the
renown of those who have done good service to their country
becomes a matter of common knowledge to the multitude,
and part of the heritage of posterity. But the chief benefit of
the ceremony is that it inspires young men to shrink from no
exertion for the general welfare, in the hope of obtaining the
glory which awaits the brave. And what I say is confirmed
by this fact. Many Romans have volunteered to decide a
whole battle by single combat; not a few have deliberately
accepted certain death, some in time of war to secure the
safety of the rest, some in time of peace to preserve the safety
of the commonwealth. There have also been instances of
men in office putting their own sons to death, in defiance of
every custom and law, because they rated the interests of
their country higher than those of natural ties even with their
nearest and dearest. There are many stories of this kind,
related of many men in Roman history; but one will be
enough for our present purpose; and I will give the name as
an instance to prove the truth of my words.
Patriotism and Purity At Rome
The story goes that Horatius Cocles, while fighting
with two enemies at the head of the bridge
over the
Tiber, which is the entrance to the
city on the north, seeing a large body of
men advancing to support his enemies, and fearing that
they would force their way into the city, turned round, and
shouted to those behind him to hasten back to the other
side and break down the bridge. They obeyed him: and
whilst they were breaking the bridge, he remained at his
post receiving numerous wounds, and checked the progress
of the enemy: his opponents being panic stricken, not so much
by his strength as by the audacity with which he held his
ground. When the bridge had been broken down, the attack
of the enemy was stopped; and Cocles then threw himself into
the river with his armour on and deliberately sacrificed his
life, because he valued the safety of his country and his own
future reputation more highly than his present life, and the
years of existence that remained to him.
23 Such is the
enthusiasm and emulation for noble deeds that are engendered
among the Romans by their customs.
Religion Keeps the Roman Commonwealth Together
Again the Roman customs and principles regarding
money transactions are better than those of
the Carthaginians. In the view of the latter
nothing is disgraceful that makes for gain;
with the former nothing is more disgraceful than to receive
bribes and to make profit by improper means. For they
regard wealth obtained from unlawful transactions to be as
much a subject of reproach, as a fair profit from the most
unquestioned source is of commendation. A proof of the fact
is this. The Carthaginians obtain office by open bribery, but
among the Romans the penalty for it is death.
With such a radical difference, therefore, between
the rewards offered to virtue among the two peoples, it is natural
that the ways adopted for obtaining them should be different also.
But the most important difference for the better which
the Roman commonwealth appears to me to
display is in their religious beliefs.
For I
conceive that what in other nations is looked
upon as a reproach, I mean a scrupulous fear of the gods, is
the very thing which keeps the Roman commonwealth together.
To such an extraordinary height is this carried among them,
both in private and public business, that nothing could
exceed it. Many people might think this unaccountable; but
in my opinion their object is to use it as a check upon the
common people. If it were possible to form a state wholly of
philosophers, such a custom would perhaps be unnecessary.
But seeing that every multitude is fickle, and full of lawless
desires, unreasoning anger, and violent passion, the only
resource is to keep them in check by mysterious terrors and
scenic effects of this sort. Wherefore, to my mind, the ancients
were not acting without purpose or at random, when they
brought in among the vulgar those opinions about the gods,
and the belief in the punishments in Hades: much rather do
I think that men nowadays are acting rashly and foolishly in
rejecting them. This is the reason why, apart from anything
else, Greek statesmen, if entrusted with a single talent, though
protected by ten checking-clerks, as many seals, and twice as
many witnesses, yet cannot be induced to keep faith: whereas
among the Romans, in their magistracies and embassies, men
have the handling of a great amount of money, and yet from
pure respect to their oath keep their faith intact. And, again,
in other nations it is a rare thing to find a man who keeps his
hands out of the public purse, and is entirely pure in such
matters: but among the Romans it is a rare thing to detect a
man in the act of committing such a crime.
24 . . .
Conclusion: Dangers Ahead for Rome
That to all things, then, which exist there is ordained
decay and change I think requires no further arguments to
show: for the inexorable course of nature is sufficient to
convince us of it.
But in all polities we observe two sources of decay existing
from natural causes, the one external, the other internal and
self-produced. The external admits of no certain or fixed
definition, but the internal follows a definite order. What
kind of polity, then, comes naturally first, and what second, I
have already stated in such a way, that those who are capable
of taking in the whole drift of my argument can henceforth
draw their own conclusions as to the future of the Roman
polity. For it is quite clear, in my opinion. When a commonwealth, after warding off many great dangers, has arrived at a
high pitch of prosperity and undisputed power, it is evident
that, by the lengthened continuance of great wealth within it,
the manner of life of its citizens will become more extravagant;
and that the rivalry for office, and in other spheres of activity, will
become fiercer than it ought to be. And as this state of things
goes on more and more, the desire of office and the shame of
losing reputation, as well as the ostentation and extravagance
of living, will prove the beginning of a deterioration. And of
this change the people will be credited with being the authors,
when they become convinced that they are being cheated by
some from avarice, and are puffed up with flattery by others from
love of office. For when that comes about, in their passionate
resentment and acting under the dictates of anger, they will
refuse to obey any longer, or to be content with having equal
powers with their leaders, but will demand to have all or far
the greatest themselves. And when that comes to pass the
constitution will receive a new name, which sounds better than
any other in the world, liberty or democracy; but, in fact, it
will become that worst of all governments, mob-rule.
With this description of the formation, growth, zenith, and
present state of the Roman polity, and having discussed also
its difference, for better and worse, from other polities, I will
now at length bring my essay on it to an end.
Even Hannibal Acknowledges the Spirit of the Romans
Resuming my history from the point at which I started
on this digression I will briefly refer to one transaction, that
I may give a practical illustration of the perfection and power
of the Roman polity at that period, as though I were producing
one of his works as a specimen of the skill of a good artist.
When Hannibal, after conquering the Romans in the
battle at
B. C. 216. Hannibal offers to put the prisoners at Cannae to ransom. |
Cannae, got possession of the eight thousand who
were guarding the Roman camp, he made them
all prisoners of war, and granted them permission
to send messages to their relations that they might
be ransomed and return home. They accordingly selected ten of their chief men, whom Hannibal allowed
to depart after binding them with an oath to return. But one
of them, just as he had got outside the palisade of the camp,
saying that he had forgotten something, went back; and, having
got what he had left behind, once more set out, under the belief
that by means of this return he had kept his promise and discharged his oath. Upon the arrival of the envoys at
Rome,
imploring and beseeching the Senate not to grudge the captured
troops their return home, but to allow them to rejoin their
friends by paying three minae each for them,—for these were
the terms, they said, granted by Hannibal,—and declaring that
the men deserved redemption, for they had neither played the
coward in the field, nor done anything unworthy of
Rome,
but had been left behind to guard the camp; and that, when
all the rest had perished, they had yielded to absolute necessity in surrendering to Hannibal: though the Romans had
been severely defeated in the battles, and though they were at
the time deprived of, roughly speaking, all their allies, they
neither yielded so far to misfortune as to disregard what was
becoming to themselves, nor omitted to take into account
any necessary consideration. They saw through Hannibal's
purpose in thus acting,—which was at once to get a large supply
of money, and at the same time to take away all enthusiasm
from the troops opposed to him, by showing that even the
conquered had a hope of getting safe home again. Therefore
the Senate, far from acceding to the request, refused all pity
even to their own relations, and disregarded the services to be
expected from these men in the future: and thus frustrated
Hannibal's calculations, and the hopes which he had founded
on these prisoners, by refusing to ransom them; and at the
same time established the rule for their own men, that they
must either conquer or die on the field, as there was no other
hope of safety for them if they were beaten. With this answer
they dismissed the nine envoys who returned of their own
accord; but the tenth who had put the cunning trick in
practice for discharging himself of his oath they put in chains
and delivered to the enemy. So that Hannibal was not so
much rejoiced at his victory in the battle, as struck with
astonishment at the unshaken firmness and lofty spirit
displayed in the resolutions of these senators.
25
