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[2]
Again,
interrogation should be employed when one of the two propositions is evident,
and it is obvious that the opponent will admit the other if you ask him. But the
interrogator, having obtained the second premise by putting a question, should
not make an additional question of what is evident, but should state the
conclusion. For instance, Socrates, when accused by Meletus of not believing in
the gods, asked1 whether he did not say that there was a
divine something; and when Meletus said yes, Socrates went on to ask if divine
beings were not either children of the gods or something godlike. When Meletus
again said yes, Socrates rejoined,
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, translated by J. H. Freese. Aristotle. Cambridge and London. Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd. 1926.
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