13. A speech has
two parts. It is necessary to state the subject, and then to prove it. Wherefore
it is impossible to make a statement without proving it, or to prove it without
first putting it forward; for both he who proves proves something, and he who
puts something forward does so in order to prove it.
[2]
The first of these parts is the statement of the case, the second the
proof, a similar division to that of problem and demonstration.
[3]
But the division now generally made is absurd; for
narrative only belongs in a manner to forensic speech, but in epideictic or
deliberative speech how is it possible that there should be narrative as it is
defined, or a refutation;
or
an epilogue in demonstrative speeches?1 In deliberative speeches,
again, exordium, comparison, and recapitulation are only admissible when there
is a conflict of opinion. For both accusation and defence are often found in
deliberative, but not qua deliberative speech. And further, the
epilogue does not even belong to every forensic speech, for instance, when it is
short, or the matter is easy to recollect; for in the epilogue what happens is
that there is a reduction of length.2
[4]
So then the necessary parts of a speech are the
statement of the case and proof. These divisions are appropriate to every
speech, and at the most the parts are four in number—exordium,
statement, proof, epilogue; for refutation of an opponent is part of the proofs,
and comparison is an amplification of one's own case, and therefore also part of
the proofs; for he who does this proves something, whereas the exordium and the
epilogue are merely aids to memory.
[5]
Therefore,
if we adopt all such divisions we shall be following Theodorus3 and his school, who distinguished narrative,
additional narrative, and preliminary narrative, refutation and additional
refutation. But one must only adopt a name to express a distinct species or a
real difference; otherwise, it becomes empty and silly, like the terms
introduced by Licymnius in his “Art,” where he speaks of
“being wafted along,” “wandering from the
subject,”4 and
“ramifications.”
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1 The generally accepted divisions are: προοίμιον （exordium）, διήγησις （narrative）, πίστις （proof）, ἐπίλογος （peroration）. （ διήγησις is a species of πρόθεσις, which is used instead of it just before.） Aristotle objects that it is （as a rule） only the forensic speech which requires a regular διήγησις, a full and detailed statement of what has happened before. In epideictic and demonstrative （deliberative） speeches, the object of which is to prove something, there is no need of another existing division called the refutation of the adversary, and in the demonstrative there can be no room for an epilogue, which is not a summary of proofs and arguments. Thus the necessary divisions of a speech are really only two; πρόθεσις and πίστις, or at most four.
2 i.e. its use is to recall the main facts briefly （sect. 4 end）, which in a short speech is needless.
3 Plat. Phaedrus 266d, where the additional kinds of narrative are omitted, and their place taken by πίστωσις and ἐπιπίστωσις （confirmation of the proof）.
4 Or, “diverting the judge's attention.”
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, translated by J. H. Freese. Aristotle. Cambridge and London. Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd. 1926.
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