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[31]
Anger
arises from acts committed against us, enmity even from those that are not; for
if we imagine a man to be of such and such a character, we hate him. Anger has
always an individual as its object, for instance Callias or Socrates, whereas
hatred applies to classes; for instance, every one hates a thief or informer.
Anger is curable by time, hatred not; the aim of anger is pain, of hatred evil;
for the angry man wishes to see what happens;1 to one who hates it does not matter. Now, the things which
cause pain are all perceptible, while things which are especially bad, such as
injustice or folly, are least perceptible; for the presence of vice causes no
pain. Anger is accompanied by pain, but hatred not; for he who is angry suffers
pain, but he who hates does not. One who is angry might feel compassion in many
cases, but one who hates, never; for the former wishes that the object of his
anger should suffer in his turn, the latter, that he should perish.
1 He wishes to see and know the result of the measures taken against those with whom he is angry. Or, it may mean that he wishes the object of his anger to feel his wrath, and to know by whom, and for what, he is punished.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, translated by J. H. Freese. Aristotle. Cambridge and London. Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd. 1926.
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