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[30]
Enthymemes that serve to refute are more
popular than those that serve to demonstrate, because the former is a conclusion
of opposites1 in a small compass, and things in juxtaposition are always
clearer to the audience. But of all syllogisms, whether refutative or
demonstrative, those are specially applauded, the result of which the hearers
foresee as soon as they are begun, and not because they are superficial
（for as they listen they congratulate themselves on anticipating the
conclusion）; and also those which the hearers are only so little behind
that they understand what they mean as soon as they are delivered.
1 “Admitting the apparent correctness of the opposing argument, we may prove the contradictory of its conclusion by an unassailable argument of our own, which is then called an elenchus” （Thomson, Laws of Thought, section 127）.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, translated by J. H. Freese. Aristotle. Cambridge and London. Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd. 1926.
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