[14]
It is thus evident that Rhetoric does not deal
with any one definite class of subjects, but, like Dialectic, [is of
general application]; also, that it is useful; and further, that its
function is not so much to persuade, as to find out in each case the existing
means of persuasion.1 The same
holds good in respect to all the other arts. For instance, it is not the
function of medicine to restore a patient to health, but only to promote this
end as far as possible; for even those whose recovery is impossible may be
properly treated. It is further evident that it belongs to Rhetoric to discover
the real and apparent means of persuasion, just as it belongs to Dialectic to
discover the real and apparent syllogism. For what makes the sophist is not the
faculty but the moral purpose. But there is a difference: in Rhetoric, one who
acts in accordance with sound argument, and one who acts in accordance with
moral purpose,
are both called rhetoricians; but in
Dialectic it is the moral purpose that makes the sophist, the dialectician being
one whose arguments rest, not on moral purpose but on the faculty.2
Let us now endeavor to treat of the method itself, to see how and by what means
we shall be able to attain our objects. And so let us as it were start again,
and having defined Rhetoric anew, pass on to the remainder of the subject.
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1 The early sophistical definition was “the art of persuasion.”
2 The essence of sophistry consists in the moral purpose, the deliberate use of fallacious arguments. In Dialectic, the dialectician has the power or faculty of making use of them when he pleases; when he does so deliberately, he is called a sophist. In Rhetoric, this distinction does not exist; he who uses sound arguments as well as he who uses false ones are both known as rhetoricians.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, translated by J. H. Freese. Aristotle. Cambridge and London. Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd. 1926.
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