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[1319b]
[1]
The last kind of democracy, because all the
population share in the government, it is not within the power of every state to
endure, and it is not easy for it to persist if it is not well constituted in
its laws and customs （but the things that result in destroying both
this state and the other forms of constitution have been nearly all of them
spoken of before1）.
With a view to setting up this kind of democracy and making the people powerful
their leaders usually acquire as many supporters as possible and admit to
citizenship not only the legitimate children of citizens but also the base-born
and those of citizen-birth on one side, I mean those whose father or mother is a
citizen; for all this element is specially congenial to a to democracy of this
sort. Popular leaders therefore
regularly introduce such institutions; they ought however only to go on adding
citizens up to the point where the multitude outnumbers the notables and the
middle class and not to go beyond that point; for if they exceed it they make
the government more disorderly, and also provoke the notables further in the
direction of being reluctant to endure the democracy, which actually took place
and caused the revolution at Cyrene2; for a small base element is
overlooked, but when it grows numerous it is more in evidence.
[20]
A
democracy of this kind will also find useful such institutions as were employed
by Cleisthenes3 at
Athens when he wished to
increase the power of the democracy, and by the party setting up the democracy
at Cyrene; different tribes and
brotherhoods must be created outnumbering the old ones, and the celebrations of
private religious rites must be grouped together into a small number of public
celebrations, and every device must be employed to make all the people as much
as possible intermingled with one another, and to break up the previously
existing groups of associates. Moreover the characteristics of a tyranny also are all thought to be
democratic, I mean for instance licence among slaves, which may really be
advantageous for the popular party up to a point, and among women and children,
and indulgence to live as one likes; a constitution of this sort will have a
large number of supporters, as disorderly living is pleasanter to the mass of
mankind than sober living.But it is not the greatest or only task of the
legislator or of those who desire to construct a constitution of this kind
merely to set it up, but rather to ensure its preservation; for it is not
difficult for any form of constitution to last for one or two or three days. We
must therefore employ the results obtained in the inquiries that we have made
already4 into the causes of
the preservation and the destruction of constitutions, and attempt in the light
of those results to establish the safety of the state, carefully avoiding the
things that cause destruction, and enacting such laws both written and unwritten
1 In Book 5.
2 In N. Africa. Diodorus （Diod. 14.34） describes a revolution there in 401 B.C., when five hundred of the rich were put to death and others fled, but after a battle a compromise was arranged.
3 See 1275b 36 n.
4 Book 5.
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 21, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1944.
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