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[1]
for these modes when coupled together make the constitutions overlap, so as to
produce oligarchical aristocracies and republics inclining towards democracy. I
refer to the combinations which ought to be investigated but have not at present
been studied, for example if the deliberative body and the system of electing
magistrates are organized oligarchically but the regulations as to the
law-courts aristocratically, or these and the structure of the deliberative body
oligarchically and the election of magistracy aristocratically, or if in some
other manner not all the parts of the constitution are appropriately
combined.Now it has been stated before1 what kind of democracy is
suited to what kind of state, and similarly which of the kinds of oligarchy is
suited to what kind of populace, and also which of the remaining constitutions
is advantageous for which people; but nevertheless since it must not only be
made clear which variety of these constitutions is best for states, but also how
both these best varieties and the other forms must be established, let us
briefly pursue the subject. And first let us speak about democracy; for at the
same time the facts will also become clear about the opposite form of
constitution, that is, the constitution which some people call oligarchy.2
And
for this inquiry we must take into view all the features that are popular and
that are thought
[20]
to go with
democracies; for it comes about from combinations of these that the kinds of
democracy are formed, and that there are different democracies and more than one
sort. In fact there are two causes for there being several kinds of democracy,
first the one stated before, the fact that the populations are different
（for we find one multitude engaged in agriculture and another
consisting of handicraftsmen and day-laborers, and when the first of these is
added to the second and again the third to both of them it not only makes a
difference in that the quality of the democracy becomes better or worse but also
by its becoming different in kind）; and the second cause is the one
about which we now speak. For the
institutions that go with democracies and seem to be appropriate to this form of
constitution make the democracies different by their combinations; for one form
of democracy will be accompanied by fewer, another by more, and another by all
of them. And it is serviceable to ascertain each of them both for the purpose of
instituting whichever of these kinds of democracy one happens to wish and for
the purpose of amending existing ones. For people setting up constitutions seek
to collect together all the features appropriate to their fundamental principle,
but in so doing they make a mistake, as has been said before in the passage
dealing with the causes of the destruction and the preservation of
constitutions. And now let us state the postulates, the ethical characters and
the aims of the various forms of democracy.Now a fundamental principle
of the democratic form of constitution is liberty—that is what is
usually asserted, implying that only under this constitution do men participate
in liberty,
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 21, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1944.
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