[1283a]
[1]
for otherwise superiority both in wealth and in
birth ought to contribute to the excellence of the performance, but they do not
do so at all. Moreover on this
theory every good thing would be commensurable with every other. For if to be of
some particular height gave more claim, then height in general would be in
competition with wealth and with free birth; therefore if A excels in height
more than B does in virtue, and speaking generally size gives more superiority
than virtue,1 all things would be commensurable
for; if such-and-such an amount of one thing is better than such-and-such an
amount of another, it is clear that such-and-such an amount of the one is equal
to that amount of another. But since
this is impossible, it is clear that in politics with good reason men do not
claim a right to office on the ground of inequality of every kind—if
one set of men are slow runners and another fast, this is no good ground for the
one set having more and the other less2 political
power, but the latter's superiority receives its honor in athletic contests; but
the claim to office must necessarily be based on superiority in those things
which go to the making of the state. Hence it is reasonable for the well-born,
free and wealthy to lay claim to honor; for there must be free men and
tax-payers, since a state consisting entirely of poor men would not be a state,
any more than one consisting of slaves. But then, granting there is need of these, it is clear
that
[20]
there is also need of justice
and civic virtue, for these are also indispensable in the administration of a
state; except that wealth and freedom are indispensable for a state's existence,
whereas justice and civic virtue are indispensable for its good
administration.As a means therefore towards a
state's existence all or at all events some of these factors would seem to make
a good claim, although as means to a good life education and virtue would make
the most just claim, as has been said also before. On the other hand since those who are equal in one thing
only ought not to have equality in all things nor those unequal as regards one
thing inequality in all, it follows that all these forms of constitution must be
deviations. Now it has been said before that all make a claim that is in a
manner just, though not all a claim that is absolutely just; the rich claiming
because they have a larger share of the land, and the land is common property,
and also as being for the most part more faithful to their covenants; the free
and well-born as being closely connected together (for the better-born
are citizens to a greater degree than those of claims, low birth, and good birth
is in every community held in honor at home), and also because it is
probable that the children of better parents will be better, for good birth
means goodness of breed; and we
shall admit that virtue also makes an equally just claim, for we hold that
justice is social virtue, which necessarily brings all the other virtues in its
train; but moreover the majority have a just claim as compared with the
minority, since they are stronger and richer and better if their superior
numbers are taken in comparison with the others' inferior numbers. Therefore
supposing all were in one city,
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