Aristotle, Politics

[1277a] [1] the goodness of a good citizen would not be one and the same as the goodness of a good man; for all ought to possess the goodness of the good citizen （that is a necessary condition of the state's being the best possible）, but it is impossible that all should possess the goodness of a good man, if it is not necessary that all the citizens in a good state should be good men. Again, since the state consists of unlike persons—just as an animal （to take this instance first） consists of soul and body, and a soul of reason and appetite, and a household of husband and wife and [ownership involves]¹ a master and slave, in the same manner a state consists of all of these persons and also of others of different classes in addition to these,—it necessarily follows that the goodness of all the citizens is not one and the same, just as among dancers the skill of a head dancer is not the same as that of a subordinate leader. It is clear then from these considerations that the goodness of a good citizen and that of a good man are not the same in general; but will the goodness of a good citizen of a particular sort be the same as that of a good man? Now we say that a good ruler is virtuous and wise, and that a citizen taking part in politics must be wise. Also some people say that even the education of a ruler must be different, as indeed we see that the sons of kings are educated in horsemanship and military exercises, and Euripides says² “ No subtleties for me, but what the state
Requireth—
” [20] implying that there is a special education for a ruler. And if the goodness of a good ruler is the same as the goodness of a good man, yet the person ruled is also a citizen, so that the goodness of a citizen in general will not be the same as that of a man, although that of a particular citizen will; for goodness as a ruler is not the same as goodness as a citizen, and no doubt this is the reason why Jason³ said that when he was not tyrant he went hungry, meaning that he did not know the art of being a private person. Another point is that we praise the ability to rule and to be ruled, and it is doubtless held that the goodness of a citizen consists in ability both to rule and to be ruled well. If then we lay it down that the goodness of the good man is displayed in ruling, whereas that of the citizen is shown in both capacities, the two capacities cannot be equally laudable. Since therefore both views are sometimes accepted, and it is thought that the ruler and the subject do not have to learn the same arts but that the citizen must know both arts and share in both capacities, . . . .⁴ And it may be discerned from the following illustration: one form of authority is that of a master; by this we mean the exercise of authority in regard to the necessary work of the house, which it is not necessary for the master to know how to execute, but rather how to utilize; the other capacity, I mean the ability actually to serve in these menial tasks, is indeed a slave's quality. But we distinguish several kinds of slave, as their employments are several. One department belongs to the handicraftsmen, who as their name implies are the persons that live by their hands,