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1276b]
[1]
For inasmuch as a state is a kind of partnership,
and is in fact a partnership of citizens in a government, when the form of the
government has been altered and is different it would appear to follow that the
state is no longer the same state, just as we say that a chorus which on one
occasion acts a comedy and on another a tragedy is a different chorus although
it is often composed of the same persons, and similarly with any other common whole or composite
structure we say it is different if the form of its structure is
different—for instance a musical tune consisting of the same notes we
call a different tune if at one time it is played in the Dorian mode and at
another in the Phrygian. Therefore if this is the case, it is clear that we must
speak of a state as being the same state chiefly with regard to its
constitution; and it is possible for it to be called by the same or by a
different designation both when its inhabitants are the same and when they are
entirely different persons. But whether a state is or is not bound in justice to
discharge its engagements when it has changed to a different constitution, is
another subject.
The next thing to consider after what has now been said is the
question whether we are to hold that the goodness of a good man is the same as
that of a good citizen, or not the same. However, if this point really is to
receive investigation, we must first ascertain in some general outline what
constitutes the excellence of a citizen.
[20]
Now a citizen we pronounced to be one sort of partner in a
community, as is a sailor. And although sailors differ from each other in
function—one is an oarsman, another helmsman, another look-out man,
and another has some other similar special designation—and so clearly
the most exact definition of their excellence will be special to each, yet there
will also be a common definition of excellence that will apply alike to all of
them; for security in navigation is the business of them all, since each of the
sailors aims at that. Similarly
therefore with the citizens, although they are dissimilar from one another,
their business is the security of their community, and this community is the
constitution, so that the goodness of a citizen must necessarily be relative to
the constitution of the state. If therefore there are various forms of
constitution, it is clear that there cannot be one single goodness which is the
perfect goodness of the good citizen; but when we speak of a good man we mean
that he possesses one single goodness, perfect goodness. Hence it is manifestly
possible to be a good citizen without possessing the goodness that constitutes a
good man. Moreover it is also
feasible to pursue the same topic by raising the question in another manner in
relation to the best form of constitution. If it is impossible
1 for a state to consist entirely of good men, and if it is
necessary for each person to perform well the work of his position, and to do
this springs from goodness, then because it is impossible for all the citizens
to be alike,