[
1265b]
[1]
because this seems to take place in the states at present. But
this ought to be regulated much more in the supposed case than it is now, for
now nobody is destitute, because estates are divided among any number, but then,
as division of estates will not be allowed, the extra children will necessarily
have nothing, whether they are fewer in number or more. And one might think that restriction ought to be
put on the birth-rate rather than on property, so as not to allow more than a
certain number of children to be produced, and that in fixing their number
consideration should be paid to the chances of its happening that some of the
children born may die, and to the absence of children in the other marriages;
but for the matter to be left alone, as it is in most states, is bound to lead
to poverty among the citizens, and poverty produces sedition and crime. The
Corinthian Phidon
1
in fact, one of the most ancient lawgivers, thought that the house-holds and the
citizen population ought to remain at the same numbers, even though at the
outset the estates of all were unequal in size; but in Plato's
Laws the opposite is the case.
2 However, we must say later
what we think would be a better system in these matters; but another question omitted in the
Laws is how the rulers will be different from the classes
ruled; the writer prescribes
[20]
that the
rulers are to stand in the same relation to the ruled as the warp of cloth
stands to the woof by being made of different wool.
3 And inasmuch as he allows a man's
total property to be increased up to five times its original value, for what
reason should not an increase in his landed estate be allowed up to a certain
point? Also it must be considered whether the proposed separation of homesteads
is not inexpedient for household economy—for the writer allotted two
homesteads separate from one another to each citizen; but it is difficult to
manage two households.
4
And the whole constitution is
intended, it is true, to be neither a democracy nor an oligarchy, but of the
form intermediate between them which is termed a republic, for the government is
constituted from the class that bears arms. If therefore he introduces this
constitution as the one most commonly existing of all forms of constitution in
the actual states, he has perhaps made a good proposal, but if he introduces it
as the next best to the first form of constitution, it is not a good proposal;
for very likely one might approve the Spartan constitution more highly, or
perhaps some other form nearer to an aristocracy. In fact some people assert that the best constitution must
be a combination of all the forms of constitution, and therefore praise the
constitution of
Sparta (for
some people say that it consists of oligarchy, monarchy and democracy, meaning
that the kingship is monarchy and the rule of the ephors oligarchy, but that an
element of democracy is introduced by the rule of the ephors because the ephors
come from the common people; while others pronounce the ephorate a tyranny but
find an element of democracy in the public mess-tables and in the other
regulations of daily life).