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[1046a]
[1]
for
potentiality and actuality extend beyond the sphere of terms which
only refer to motion.When
we have discussed this sense of potentiality we will, in the course of
our definitions of actuality,1 explain the others also.We have made it plain elsewhere2 that "potentiality" and
"can" have several senses.All senses which are merely equivocal may be dismissed; for some are
used by analogy, as in geometry,3 and we
call things possible or impossible because they "are" or "are not" in
some particular way. But the potentialities which conform to the same
type are all principles, and derive their meaning from one primary
sense of potency, which is the source of change in some other thing,
or in the same thing qua other.One kind of potentiality is the power of being affected; the
principle in the patient itself which initiates a passive change in it
by the action of some other thing, or of itself qua other. Another is a positive state of impassivity in respect
of deterioration or destruction by something else or by itself qua something else; i.e. by a transformatory
principle—for all these definitions contain the formula of
the primary sense of potentiality.Again, all these potentialities are so called
either because they merely act or are acted upon in a particular way,
or because they do so well . Hence in their formulae also
the formulae of potentiality in the senses previously described are
present in some degree.Clearly, then,
in one sense the potentiality for acting and being acted upon is
one
[20]
(for a thing is
"capable" both because it itself possesses the power of being acted
upon, and also because something else has the power of being acted
upon by it);and in another
sense it is not; for it is partly in the patient (for it is because it
contains a certain principle, and because even the matter is a kind of
principle, that the patient is acted upon; i.e., one thing is acted
upon by another: oily stuff is inflammable, and stuff which yields in
a certain way is breakable, and similarly in other
cases)—and
partly in the agent; e.g. heat and the art of building: the former in
that which produces heat, and the latter in that which builds. Hence
in so far as it is a natural unity, nothing is acted upon by itself;
because it is one, and not a separate thing."Incapacity" and "the incapable" is the privation
contrary to "capacity" in this sense; so that every "capacity" has a
contrary incapacity for producing the same result in respect of the
same subject.Privation has several senses4—it is applied (1.) to anything which
does not possess a certain attribute; (2.) to that which would
naturally possess it, but does not; either (a) in general, or (b) when
it would naturally possess it; and either (1) in a particular way,
e.g. entirely, or (2) in any way at all. And in some cases if things
which would naturally possess some attribute lack it as the result of
constraint, we say that they are "deprived."Since
some of these principles are inherent in inanimate things, and others
in animate things and in the soul and in the rational part of the
soul,
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