[1037a]
[1]
Indeed there will be
matter in some sense in everything which is not essence or form
considered independently, but a particular thing. Thus the semicircles
will be parts not of the universal circle but of the particular
circles, as we said before1—for
some matter is sensible, and some intelligible.It is clear also that the soul is the
primary substance, and the body matter; and "man" or "animal" is the
combination of both taken universally. And "
Socrates" or "Coriscus" has a
double sense, that is if the soul too can be called
Socrates (for by
Socrates some mean the soul and
some the concrete person); but if
Socrates means simply this soul and
this body, the individual is composed similarly to
the universal.Whether there is some other material
component of these substances besides their matter, and whether we
should look for some further substance in them, such as numbers or
something of that kind, must be considered later.2 It
is with a view to this that we are trying to determine the nature of
sensible substances, since in a sense the study of sensible substances
belongs to physics or secondary philosophy; for the physicist must
know not only about the matter, but also about the substance according
to the formula; this is even more essential.And in the case of definitions, in what
sense the elements in the formula are parts of the definition, and why
the definition is one formula (for the thing is clearly one,
[20]
but in virtue of what is it one,
seeing that it has parts?); this must be considered later.3We
have stated, then, in a general account which covers all cases, what
essence is, and how it is independent; and why the formula of the
essence of some things contains the parts of the thing defined, while
that of others does not; and we have shown that the material parts of
a thing cannot be present in the formula of the substance (since they
are not even parts of the substance in that sense, but of the concrete
substance; and of this in one sense there is a formula, and in another
sense there is not.There
is no formula involving the matter, for this is indeterminate; but
there is a formula in accordance with the primary substance, e.g., in
the case of a man, the formula of the soul; because the substance is
the indwelling form, of which and of the matter the so called concrete
substance is composed. E.g., concavity is such a form, since from this
and "nose" is derived "snub nose" and "snubness"—for "nose"
will be present twice over in these expressions);but in the concrete substance, e.g.
snub nose or Callias, matter will be present too.4 We
have stated also that the essence and the individual are in some cases
the same,
2 In Books 13 and 14.
4 Chapters. 10-11; and cf. Aristot. Met. 7.4.
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