[1036a]
[1]
for "circle" is the same as "essence of
circle," and "soul" the same as "essence of soul."But when we come to the concrete thing,
e.g. this circle—which is a particular individual, either
sensible or intelligible (by intelligible circles I mean those of
mathematics,1 and by sensible those which are of bronze
or wood)—of these individuals there is no
definition;we
apprehend them by intelligence or perception; and when they have
passed from the sphere of actuality it is uncertain whether they exist
or not, but they are always spoken of and apprehended by the universal
formula. But the matter is in itself unknowable. Some matter is
sensible and some intelligible; sensible, such as bronze and wood and
all movable matter; intelligible, that which is present in sensible
things not qua sensible, e.g. the objects of
mathematics.2We have now discussed the case of the whole and part, and of prior
and posterior. But we must answer the question, when we are asked
which is prior—the right angle and circle and animal, or
that into which they are resolved and of which they are composed, i.e.
their parts—by saying that neither is
absolutely prior.For if the soul also is the
animal or living thing, or the soul of the individual is
the individual, and "being a circle" is the circle, and
"being a right angle" or the essence of the right angle
is the right angle, then we must admit that the whole in
one sense is posterior to the part in one sense:
[20]
e.g. to the parts in the formula and
the parts of a particular right angle(since both the material right angle of bronze
and the right angle included by individual lines are posterior to
their parts), but the immaterial angle is posterior to the parts in
the formula, but prior to the parts in the individual. We must not
give an unqualified answer. And if the soul is not the animal but
something else, even so we must say that some wholes are prior and
some are not, as has been stated.The question
naturally presents itself, what sort of parts belong to the form and
what sort belong not to it but to the concrete object. Yet if this is
not plain it is impossible to define the particular; because the
definition refers to the universal and the form. Therefore if it is
not clear what kind of parts are material and what kind are not, the
formula of the thing will not be clear either.In the case of things which can be seen
to be induced in specifically different materials, as, e.g., a circle
is in bronze and stone and wood, it seems clear that these things, the
bronze and the stone, are in no sense part of the essential substance
of the circle, because it is separable from them.As for things which are not visibly
separable, there is no reason why the same should not apply to them;
e.g., if all the circles that had ever been seen were bronze;
1 i.e., something very similar to the Platonic "intermediates." Cf. Introduction.
2 See Aristot. Met. 13.2, 3.
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