[1022b]
[1]
"Disposition" means arrangement of that
which has parts, either in space or in potentiality or in form. It
must be a kind of position, as indeed is clear from the word,
"disposition.""Having"1
means (a) In one sense an activity, as it were, of the haver and the
thing had, or as in the case of an action or motion; for when one
thing makes and another is made, there is between them an act of
making. In this way between the man who has a garment and the garment
which is had, there is a "having." Clearly, then, it is impossible to
have a "having" in this sense; for there will be an
infinite series if we can have the having of what we have.But (b) there is another sense
of "having" which means a disposition, in virtue of which the thing
which is disposed is disposed well or badly, and either independently
or in relation to something else. E.g., health is a state, since it is
a disposition of the kind described. Further, any part of such a
disposition is called a state; and hence the excellence of the parts
is a kind of state."Affection" means (a) In one sense, a
quality in virtue of which alteration is possible; e.g., whiteness and
blackness, sweetness and bitterness, heaviness and lightness, etc. (b)
The actualizations of these qualities; i.e. the alterations already
realized. (c) More particularly, hurtful alterations and
motions,
[20]
and
especially hurts which cause suffering. (d) Extreme cases of
misfortune and suffering are called "affections."2We speak of
"privation": (a) In one sense, if a thing does not possess an
attribute which is a natural possession, even if the thing itself
would not naturally possess it3; e.g., we
say that a vegetable is "deprived" of eyes. (b) If a thing does not
possess an attribute which it or its genus would naturally possess.
E.g., a blind man is not "deprived" of sight in the same sense that a
mole is; the latter is "deprived" in virtue of its genus, but the
former in virtue of himself.4(c) If
a thing has not an attribute which it would naturally possess, and
when it would naturally possess it (for blindness is a form of
privation; but a man is not blind at any age, but only if
he lacks sight at the age when he would naturally possess it5), and similarly if it6 lacks an attribute in the medium and organ
and relation and manner in which it would naturally possess
it.(d) The forcible
removal of anything is called privation. (e) Privation has as many
senses as there are senses of negation derived from the negative affix
(ἀ-). For we call a thing
"unequal" because it does not possess equality (though it would
naturally do so); and "invisible" either because it has no color at
all or because it has only a faint one; and "footless" either because
it has no feet at all or because it has rudimentary feet.Again, a negative affix may
mean "having something in a small degree"—e.g.
"stoneless"—
1 ῞εξις means not only "having" but "habit" or "state." Cf. Latin, habitus.
2 The English equivalent for πάθος in this sense would be "calamity" or "disaster."
3 This is not a proper sense of privation, as Aristotle implies by choosing an example from everyday speech.
4 i.e., a mole is blind as being a member of a blind genus, whereas a man is blind only as an individual. Of course moles are not really blind, but we still speak as though they were.
5 The qualification refers, I suppose, to the fact that an embryo does not naturally possess sight.
6 The subject seems to be indefinite, but no doubt Aristotle is thinking primarily of the particular example which he has just given. A man "is not called blind if he does not see in the dark, or if he does not see with his ears, or if he does not see sound, or if he does not see what is behind him or too far away" ( Ross).
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989.
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