[1019b]
[1]
(b) That over which something else has
a potency of this kind. (c) That which has the potency of changing
things, either for the worse or for the better (for it seems that even
that which perishes is "capable" of perishing; otherwise, if it had
been incapable, it would not have perished. As it is, it has a kind of
disposition or cause or principle which induces such an
affection.Sometimes
it seems to be such as it is because it has something,
and sometimes because it is deprived of something; but if
privation is in a sense a state or "habit," everything will be
"potent" through having something; and so a thing is
"potent" in virtue of having a certain "habit" or principle, and also
in virtue of having the privation of that "habit," if it can
have privation; and if privation is not in a sense
"habit," the term "potent" is equivocal).(d) A thing is "potent" if neither any other
thing nor itself qua other contains a potency
or principle destructive of it. (e) All these things are "potent"
either because they merely might chance to happen or not to happen, or
because they might do so well . Even in inanimate things
this kind of potency is found; e.g. in instruments; for they say that
one lyre "can" be played, and another not at all, if it has not a good
tone."Impotence" is a privation of
potency—a kind of abolition of the principle which has been
described—either in general or in something which would
naturally possess that principle, or even at a time when it would
naturally already possess it (for we should not use
"impotence"—in respect of begetting—in the same
sense of a boy, a man and a eunuch).
[20]
Again, there is an "impotence" corresponding to
each kind of potency; both to the kinetic and to the successfully
kinetic.Some things are said to be "impotent"
in accordance with this meaning of "impotence," but others in a
different sense, namely "possible" and "impossible." "Impossible"
means: (a) that whose contrary is necessarily true; e.g., it is
impossible that the diagonal of a square should be commensurable with
the sides, because such a thing is a lie, whose contrary is not only
true but inevitable. Hence that it is commensurable is not only a lie
but necessarily a lie.And the contrary of the impossible, i.e. the possible, is when the
contrary is not necessarily a lie; e.g., it is possible that a man
should be seated, for it is not necessarily a lie that he should not
be seated. "Possible," then, means in one sense, as we have said, that
which is not necessarily a lie; in another, that which is true; and in
another, that which may be true.(The "power" in
geometry1 is so called by an extension of meaning.)These are the senses of "potent" which do
not correspond to "potency." Those which do correspond to it all refer
to the first meaning,
1 A square was called a δύναμις. Plat. Rep 587d; Plat. Tim. 31c.
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