[1015b]
[1]
only when it is impossible to act according to
impulse, because of the compulsion: which shows that necessity is that
because of which a thing cannot be otherwise; and the same is true of
the concomitant conditions of living and of the good. For when in the
one case good, and in the other life or existence, is impossible
without certain conditions, these conditions are necessary, and the
cause is a kind of necessity.(e) Again, demonstration is a
"necessary" thing, because a thing cannot be otherwise if the
demonstration has been absolute. And this is the result of the first
premisses, when it is impossible for the assumptions upon which the
syllogism depends to be otherwise.Thus
of necessary things, some have an external cause of their necessity,
and others have not, but it is through them that other things are of
necessity what they are.Hence the "necessary" in the primary and proper sense is the
simple , for it cannot be in more than one
condition. Hence it cannot be in one state and in another; for if so
it would ipso facto be in more than one condition. Therefore if there
are certain things which are eternal and immutable, there is nothing
in them which is compulsory or which violates their nature.The term "one" is used (1.) in an accidental, (2.) in an absolute
sense. (1.) In the accidental sense it is used as in the case of
"Coriscus"1 and "cultured" and "cultured Coriscus" (for
"Coriscus" and "cultured" and "cultured Coriscus" mean the
same);and "cultured"
and "upright"
[20]
and "cultured
upright Coriscus." For all these terms refer accidentally to one
thing; "upright" and "cultured" because they are accidental to one
substance, and "cultured" and "Coriscus" because the one is accidental
to the other.And similarly
in one sense "cultured Coriscus" is one with "Coriscus," because one
part of the expression is accidental to the other, e.g. "cultured" to
"Coriscus"; and "cultured Coriscus" is one with "upright Coriscus,"
becauseone part of
each expression is one accident of one and the same thing. It is the
same even if the accident is applied to a genus or a general term;
e.g., "man" and "cultured man" are the same, either because "cultured"
is an accident of "man," which is one substance, or because both are
accidents of some individual, e.g. Coriscus.But they do not both belong to it in the same
way; the one belongs presumably as genus in the
substance, and the other as condition or
affection of the substance. Thus all things which are
said to be "one" in an accidental sense are said to be so in this
way.(2.) Of those things which are said to be in
themselves one, (a) some are said to be so in virtue of their
continuity; e.g., a faggot is made continuous by its string, and
pieces of wood by glue;
1 Coriscus of Scepsis was a Platonist with whom Aristotle was probably acquainted; but the name is of course chosen quite arbitrarily.
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