[1003a]
[1]
For
the potentiality is prior to the actual cause, and the potential need
not necessarily always become actual. On the other hand, if the
elements exist potentially, it is possible for nothing to exist; for
even that which does not yet exist is capable of existing. That which
does not exist may come to be, but nothing which cannot exist comes to
be.1(xi.) Besides the foregoing problems about the first principles we
must also raise the question whether they are universal or such as we
describe the particulars to be. For if they are universal, there will
be no substances; for no common term denotes an individual thing, but
a type; and substance is an individual thing.But if the common predicate be hypostatized as
an individual thing, Socrates
will be several beings: himself, and Man, and Animal—that
is, if each predicate denotes one particular thing.These then are the consequences if the
principles are universal. If on the other hand they are not universal
but like particulars, they will not be knowable; for the knowledge of
everything is universal. Hence there will have to be other universally
predicated principles prior to the first principles, if there is to be
any knowledge of them.2
1 For the relation of potentiality to actuality see Aristot. Met. 9.1-9. The second point raised in this connection in ch. 1 is not discussed here; for actuality and motion see Aristot. Met. 12.6, 7.
2 For the answer to this problem see Aristot. Met. 7.13-15, Aristot. Met. 13.10.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.