This text is part of:
Search the Perseus Catalog for:
[1089a]
[1]
the chief being that
they visualized the problem in an archaic form. They supposed that all
existing things would be one, absolute Being, unless they encountered
and refuted Parmenides' dictum:It will
ne'er be proved that things which are not, are,1i.e., that
they must show that that which is not, is; for only so—of
that which is, and of something else—could existing things
be composed, if they are more than one.2 However, (i) in the first
place, if "being" has several meanings (for sometimes it means
substance, sometimes quality, sometimes quantity, and so on with the
other categories), what sort of unity will all the things that are
constitute, if not-being is not to be? Will it be the substances that
are one, or the affections (and similarly with the other categories),
or all the categories together? in which case the "this" and the
"such" and the "so great," and all the other categories which denote
some sense of Being, will be one.But it is absurd, or rather impossible, that
the introduction of one thing should account for the fact that "what
is" sometimes means "so-and-so," sometimes "such-and-such," sometimes
"of such-and-such a size," sometimes "in such-and-such a place."
(2) Of what sort of not-being and Being do
real things consist? Not-being, too, has several senses, inasmuch as
Being has; and "not-man" means "not so-and-so," whereas "not straight"
means "not such-and-such," and "not five feet long" means "not of
such-and-such a size." What sort of Being and not-being, then, make
existing things a plurality?
[20]
This thinker
means by the not-being which together with Being makes existing things
a plurality, falsity and everything of this nature3; and for this reason also it was said4 that we must assume something which is false, just
as geometricians assume that a line is a foot long when it is
not.But this cannot
be so; for (a) the geometricians do not assume anything that is false
(since the proposition is not part of the logical inference5), and (b) existing things are not generated from
or resolved into not-being in this sense. But not only has "not-being"
in its various cases as many meanings as there are categories, but
moreover the false and the potential are called "not-being"; and it is
from the latter that generation takes place—man comes to be
from that which is not man but is potentially man, and white from that
which is not white but is potentially white; no matter whether one
thing is generated or many. Clearly the point at issue is
how "being" in the sense of the substances is many; for the things
that are generated are numbers and lines and bodies. It is absurd to
inquire how Being as substance is many, and not how qualities or
quantities are many.Surely the indeterminate dyad or the Great and Small is no reason
why there should be two whites or many colors or flavors or shapes;
1 Parmenides Fr. 7 (Diels).
2 Cf. Plat. Soph. 237a, 241d, 256e.
3 Plat. Soph. 237a, 240; but Aristotle's statement assumes too much.
4 Presumably by some Platonist.
5 i.e., the validity of a geometrical proof does not depend upon the accuracy of the figure.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.