[1086b]
[1]
They considered that
the particulars in the sensible world are in a state of flux, and that
none of them persists, but that the universal exists besides them and
is something distinct from them.This theory, as we have said in an earlier
passage,1 was initiated by
Socrates as a result of his definitions, but he did
not separate universals from particulars; and he was right in not
separating them. This is evident from the facts; for without the
universal we cannot acquire knowledge, and the separation of the
universal is the cause of the difficulties which we find in the Ideal
theory.Others,2
regarding it as necessary, if there are to be any substances besides
those which are sensible and transitory, that they should be
separable, and having no other substances, assigned separate existence
to those which are universally predicated; thus it followed that
universals and particulars are practically the same kind of thing.
This in itself would be one difficulty in the view which we have just
described.3 Let us now mention a point
which presents some difficulty both to those who hold the Ideal theory
and to those who do not. It has been stated already, at the beginning
of our treatise, among the problems.4 If we do
not suppose substances to be separate, that is in the way in which
particular things are said to be separate, we shall do away with
substance in the sense in which we wish to maintain it; but if we
suppose substances to be separable,
[20]
how are we to regard their elements and
principles?If they
are particular and not universal, there will be as many real things as
there are elements, and the elements will not be knowable. For let us
suppose that the syllables in speech are substances, and that their
letters are the elements of substances. Then there must be only one
BA, and only one of each of the other syllables; that is, if they are
not universal and identical in form, but each is numerically one and
an individual, and not a member of a class bearing a common
name.(Moreover, the
Platonists assume that each Ideal entity is unique.) Now if this is
true of the syllables, it is also true of their letters. Hence there
will not be more than one A, nor more than one of any of the other
letters,5 on the same
argument by which in the case of the syllable there cannot be more
than one instance of the same syllable. But if this is so, there will
be no other things besides the letters, but only the
letters. Nor again will the elements be
knowable; for they will not be universal, and knowledge is of the
universal. This can be seen by reference to proofs and definitions;
for there is no logical conclusion that a given triangle has its
angles equal to two right angles unless every triangle has its angles
equal to two right angles, or that a given man is an animal unless
every man is an animal.
1 Aristot. Met. 13.4, and cf. Aristot. Met. 1.6.
2 The Platonists.
3 See Introduction.
4 Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.4.8-10, Aristot. Met. 3.6.7-9.
5 This is, as a matter of fact, the assumption upon which the whole argument rests; Aristotle is arguing in a circle.
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