[1085a]
[1]
Further, if 2 itself and 3 itself are each one
thing, both together make 2. From what, then, does this 2
come? Since there is no contact in numbers, but
units which have nothing between them—e.g. those in 2 or
3—are successive, the question might be raised whether or
not they are successive to Unity itself, and whether of the numbers
which succeed it 2 or one of the units in 2 is prior. We
find similar difficulties in the case of the genera posterior to
number1—the line, plane and solid. Some derive these from
the species of the Great and Small; viz. lines from the Long and
Short, planes from the Broad and Narrow, and solids from the Deep and
Shallow. These are species of the Great and Small.As for the geometrical first principle
which corresponds to the arithmetical One, different Platonists
propound different views.2 In these too we can
see innumerable impossibilities, fictions and contradictions of all
reasonable probability. For (a) we get that the geometrical forms are
unconnected with each other, unless their principles also are so
associated that the Broad and Narrow is also Long and Short; and if
this is so, the plane will be a line and the solid a plane.
[20]
Moreover, how can angles and figures, etc.,
be explained? And (b) the same result follows as in the case of
number; for these concepts are modifications of magnitude, but
magnitude is not generated from them, any more than a line is
generated from the Straight and Crooked, or solids from the Smooth and
Rough. Common to all these Platonic theories is the
same problem which presents itself in the case of species of a genus
when we posit universals—viz. whether it is the Ideal animal
that is present in the particular animal, or some other "animal"
distinct from the Ideal animal. This question will cause no difficulty
if the universal is not separable; but if, as the Platonists say,
Unity and the numbers exist separately, then it is not easy to solve
(if we should apply the phrase "not easy" to what is
impossible).For when
we think of the one in 2, or in number generally, are we thinking of
an Idea or of something else?These
thinkers, then, generate geometrical magnitudes from this sort of
material principle, but others3 generate them from the point (they regard the point
not as a unity but as similar to Unity) and another material principle
which is not plurality but is similar to it; yet in the case of these
principles none the less we get the same difficulties.For if the matter is one, line,
plane and solid will be the same; because the product of the same
elements must be one and the same.
1 Cf. Aristot. Met. 13.6.10.
2 Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.4.34, Aristot. Met. 14.3.9.
3 The reference is probably to Speusippus; Plato and Xenocrates did not believe in points (Aristot. Met. 1.9.25, Aristot. Met. 13.5.10 n).
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