[1079a]
[1]
(in seeking for
whose causes these thinkers were led on from particulars to Ideas);
because corresponding to each thing there is a synonymous entity,
apart from the substances (and in the case of non-substantial things
there is a One over the Many) both in our everyday world and in the
realm of eternal entities. Again, not one of the ways in
which it is attempted to prove that the Forms exist demonstrates their
point; from some of them no necessary conclusion follows, and from
others it follows that there are Form of things of which they hold
that there are no Forms.For according to the arguments from the sciences, there will be
Forms of all things of which there are sciences; and according to the
"One-over-Many" argument, of negations too; and according to the
argument that "we have some conception of what has perished" there
will be Forms of perishable things, because we have a mental picture
of these things. Further, of the most exact arguments some establish
Ideas of relations, of which the Idealists deny that there is a
separate genus, and others state the "Third Man."And in general the arguments for the
Forms do away with things which are more important to the exponents of
the Forms than the existence of the Ideas; for they imply that it is
not the Dyad that is primary, but Number; and that the relative is
prior to number, and therefore to the absolute; and all the other
conclusions in respect of which certain persons by following up the
views held about the Forms have gone against the principles of the
theory. Again, according to the assumption by which
they hold that the Ideas exist,
[20]
there will be Forms not only of substances but of
many other things (since the concept is one not only in the case of
substances but in the case of non-substantial things as well; and
there can be sciences not only of substances but also of other things;
and there are a thousand other similar consequences);but it follows necessarily
from the views generally held about them that if the Forms are
participated in, there can only be Ideas of substances, because they
are not participated in accidentally; things can only participate in a
Form in so far as it is not predicated of a subject.I mean, e.g., that if a thing
participates in absolute doubleness, it participates also in something
eternal, but only accidentally; because it is an accident of
"doubleness" to be eternal. Thus the Ideas will be substance. But the
same terms denote substance in the sensible as in the Ideal world;
otherwise what meaning will there be in saying that something exists
besides the particulars, i.e. the unity comprising their
multiplicity?If the
form of the Ideas and of the things which participate in them is the
same, they will have something in common (for why should duality mean
one and the same thing in the case of perishable 2's and the 2's which
are many but eternal,
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989.
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