[1063b]
[1]
For
to the diseased, since they are not in the same physical condition as
when they were well, sensible qualities do not appear to be the same;
although this does not mean that the sensible things themselves
partake of any change, but that they cause different, and not the
same, sensations in the diseased. Doubtless the same must be true if
the change which we have referred to takes place in us.If, however, we do not change
but remain always the same, there must be something
permanent.As for those who raise
the aforesaid difficulties on dialectical grounds,1 it is not easy to find a
solution which will convince them unless they grant some assumption
for which they no longer require an explanation; for every argument
and proof is possible only in this way. If they grant no assumption,
they destroy discussion and reasoning in general.Thus there is no arguing with people of
this kind; but in the case of those who are perplexed by the
traditional difficulties it is easy to meet and refute the causes of
their perplexity. This is evident from what has been already
said. Thus from these considerations it is obvious
that opposite statements cannot be true of the same thing at one time;
nor can contrary statements, since every contrariety involves
privation. This is clear if we reduce the formulae of contraries to
their first principles.2Similarly no
middle term can be predicated of one and the same thing
[20]
of which one of the contraries
is predicated.3 If, when the subject is white, we say
that it is neither white nor black, we shall be in error; for it
follows that it is and is not white, because the first of the two
terms in the complex statement will be true of the subject, and this
is the contradictory of white.Thus we
cannot be right in holding the views either of Heraclitus4 or of Anaxagoras.5 If we could, it would follow that contraries
are predicable of the same subject; for when he6 says that in everything there is a
part of everything, he means that nothing is sweet any more than it is
bitter, and similarly with any of the other pairs of contraries; that
is, if everything is present in everything not merely potentially but
actually and in differentiation. Similarly
all statements cannot be false, nor all true. Among
many other difficulties which might be adduced as involved by this
supposition there is the objection that if all statements were false,
not even this proposition itself would be true; while if they were all
true it would not be false to say that they are all false.
Every science inquires for certain principles and causes with respect
to every knowable thing which comes within its scope7;
1 With this section cf. Aristot. Met. 4.5.3, 4, Aristot. Met. 4.6.1-3.
2 Cf. Aristot. Met. 4.6.10, 11.
3 Cf. Aristot. Met. 4.7 where, however, the point which is proved is that there can be no intermediate between contradictories.
6 Anaxagoras. What he really meant was that even the sweetest things contain some bitter particles. Cf. Anaxagoras Fr. 11 (Diels); Burnet, E.G.P. 129.
7 This chapter corresponds to Aristot. Met. 6.1; cf. also Aristot. Met. 4.3.1-6 and ch. 4 above. It also answers the problem stated in ch. 1.2.
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989.
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