[1063a]
[1]
for the same thing never seems to
some people sweet and to others to the contrary unless one of the
parties has the organ of sense which distinguishes the said flavors
injured or impaired. Such being the case, the one party should be
taken as the "measure," and the other not.And I hold the same in the case of good and
bad, and of beautiful and ugly, and of all other such qualities. For
to maintain this view1 is just the same
as to maintain that what appears to us when we press the finger below
the eye and make a thing seem two instead of one must be two because
it appears to be so, and then afterwards that it must be one; because
if we do not interfere with our sight that which is one appears to be
one.And in general
it is absurd to form our opinion of the truth from the appearances of
things in this world of ours which are subject to change and never
remain in the same state2; for it is by reference to those things which are
always the same state and undergo no change that we should prosecute
our search for truth.Of
this kind are the heavenly bodies; for these do not appear to be now
of one nature and subsequently of another, but are manifestly always
the same and have no change of any kind.Again, if there is motion there is also something which is moved;
and everything is moved from something and into something. Therefore
that which is moved must be in that from which it is to be
moved,
[20]
and must also
not be in it; and must be moved into so-and-so and must also come to
be in it; but the contradictory statements cannot be true at the same
time, as our opponents allege.And if the things of our world are in a state
of continuous flux and motion in respect of quantity, and we assume
this although it is not true, why should they not be constant in
respect of quality?3 It appears
that not the least reason why our opponents predicate opposite
statements of the same thing is that they start with the assumption
that quantity is not constant in the case of bodies; hence they say
that the same thing is and is not six feet long.But essence depends upon quality, and
this is of a determinate, whereas quantity is of an indeterminate
nature.Again, when the doctor
orders them to adopt some article of diet, why do they adopt it?4 For on their view it is no more
true that a thing is bread than that it is not; and therefore it would
make no difference whether they ate it or not. But as it is, they
adopt a particular food as though they knew the truth about it and it
were the food prescribed;yet they ought not to do so if there were no fixed and permanent
nature in sensible things and everything were always in a state of
motion and flux.Again, if we are always
changing and never remain the same, is it any wonder that to us, as to
the diseased, things never appear the same?5
1 i.e., that the same thing has contrary qualities.
2 sect. 8, 9 (first half)=Aristot. Met. 4.5.21, 22.
3 Cf. Aristot. Met. 4.5.20, 21.
4 Cf. Aristot. Met. 4.4.39-42.
5 With this section cf. Aristot. Met. 4.5.7-14.
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989.
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