[1059a]
[1]
and this applies to "the perishable"
and "the imperishable." Nothing is accidentally perishable; for that
which is accidental may not be applicable; but perishability is an
attribute which applies necessarily when it is applicable at all.
Otherwise one and the same thing will be imperishable as well as
perishable, if it is possible for perishability not to apply to
it.Thus
perishability must be either the substance or in the substance of
every perishable thing. The same argument also applies to the
imperishable; for both perishability and imperishability are
attributes which are necessarily applicable. Hence the characteristics
in respect of which and in direct consequence of which one thing is
perishable and another imperishable are opposed; and therefore they
must be other in kind.Thus it is obvious that there cannot be Forms such as some thinkers
maintain; for then there would be both a perishable and an
imperishable "man."1 Yet the Forms are said to
be the same in species as the particulars, and not merely to share a
common predicate with them; but things which are other in genus differ
more widely than things which are other in species.
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989.
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