[993a]
[1]
On the other
hand, assuming that this knowledge should turn out to be innate,1 it is astonishing that we should possess
unawares the most important of the sciences. Further, how is one to
know of what elements things consist? how is it to
be established?Even this
presents a difficulty, because the facts might be disputed, as happens
in the case of certain syllables—for some say that ZA is
composed of S, D and A, while others say that it is a distinct sound
and not any one of those which are familiar to us.2Further, how can one gain
knowledge of the objects of a particular sense-perception without
possessing that sense? Yet it should be possible, that if the elements
of which all things consist, as composite sounds consist of their
peculiar3 elements, are the same.Thus it is obvious, from the statements of earlier thinkers also,
that all inquiry is apparently directed towards the causes described
in the Physics,4 and that we cannot suggest any other cause apart from
these. They were, however, only vaguely conceived; and although in one
sense they have all been stated before, in another they have not been
stated at all.For the
earliest philosophy speaks falteringly, as it were, on all subjects;
being new and in its infancy. Even Empedocles says that bone exists by
virtue of its ratio,5
which is the definition or essence of a thing.But by similar reasoning both flesh and
every other thing,
[20]
or else
nothing at all, must be ratio; for it must be because of this, and not
because of their matter—which he calls fire, earth, water
and air—that flesh and bone and every other thing
exists.If anyone
else had stated this, he would necessarily have agreed, but his own
statement was not clear.These and
similar points have been explained already. We will now return to the
difficulties which might be raised about these same questions, for
they may throw some light upon subsequent difficulties.6
1 Cf. the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις (recollection), Plat. Meno 81c, Plat. Phaedo 72e.
2 στοιχεῖον means both "an element" and "a letter of the alphabet"; hence letters are often used as analogues of the material elements. The point here is: Is Z or rather the Greek ζ) a στοιχεῖον, or is it further analyzable? Since this can be disputed, we must expect differences of opinion about the elements in general.
3 Peculiar to them as sounds, not as individual sounds. If sights and sounds had the same elements, sight, which knows those elements as composing sights, would know them as composing sounds; i.e., we could see sounds.
4 Aristot. Phys. 2.3, 7.
5 Empedocles Fr. 96, 98 (Diels), Ritter and Preller 175. Aristotle says that Empedocles had some idea of the essence or formal cause, but did not apply it generally.
6 The reference is to Book 3. See Introduction.
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989.
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