[989a]
[1]
and this will be that body which is
rarest and composed of the finest particles.Hence all who posit Fire as first principle
will be in the closest agreement with this theory. However, even among
the other thinkers everyone agrees that the primary corporeal element
is of this kind. At any rate none of the Monists thought earth likely
to be an element—obviously on account of the size of its
particles—but each of the other three has had an advocate; for some name fire
as the primary element, others water, and others air.1 And yet why do they not suggest
earth too, as common opinion does? for people say "Everything is
earth."And Hesiod
too says2
that earth was generated first of corporeal things—so
ancient and popular is the conception found to be. Thus according to
this theory anyone who suggests any of these bodies other than fire,
or who assumes something "denser than air but rarer than water,"3 will be wrong.On the other hand if what is posterior
in generation is prior in nature, and that which is developed and
combined is posterior in generation, then the reverse will be the
case; water will be prior to air, and earth to water. So much for
those who posit one cause such as we have
described.
[20]
The same will apply too if anyone
posits more than one, as e.g. Empedocles says that matter consists of
four bodies;objections
must occur in his case also, some the same as before, and some
peculiar to him. First, we can see things being generated from each
other in a way which shows that fire and earth do not persist as the
same corporeal entity. (This subject has been treated in my works on
Natural Science.4) Again with regard to the cause of motion in
things, whether one or two should be assumed, it must not be thought
that his account is entirely correct or even reasonable.5And in general those who hold such views as
these must of necessity do away with qualitative alteration; for on
such a theory cold will not come from hot nor hot from cold, because
to effect this there must be something which actually takes on these
contrary qualities: some single element which becomes both fire and
water—which Empedocles denies.If one were to
infer that Anaxagoras recognized two6 elements, the inference would accord closely
with a view which, although he did not articulate it himself, he must
have accepted as developed by others.To say that originally everything was a
mixture is absurd for various reasons,
1 Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.5, 8.
2 Cf. Aristot. Met. 4.1.
4 Aristot. De Caelo, 3.7; Aristot. De Gen. et Corr. 2.6.
5 Cf. Aristot. Met. 4.6.
6 Mind, and the "mixture" of homoeomerous particles.
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