[988a]
[1]
The
fact, however, is just the reverse, and the theory is illogical; for
whereas the Platonists derive multiplicity from matter although their
Form generates only once,1 it is obvious
that only one table can be made from one piece of timber, and yet he
who imposes the form upon it, although he is but one, can make many
tables. Such too is the relation of male to female: the female is
impregnated in one coition, but one male can impregnate many females.
And these relations are analogues of the principles referred
to.This, then, is Plato's verdict upon the
question which we are investigating. From this account it is clear
that he only employed two causes2: that of the essence, and the
material cause; for the Forms are the cause of the essence in
everything else, and the One is the cause of it in the
Forms.He also tells
us what the material substrate is of which the Forms are predicated in
the case of sensible things, and the One in that of the
Forms—that it is this the duality, the "Great and Small."
Further, he assigned to these two elements respectively the causation
of good3 and of evil; a problem which,
as we have said,4 had also been
considered by some of the earlier philosophers, e.g. Empedocles and
Anaxagoras.We have given only a concise and
summary account of those thinkers who have expressed views about the
causes
[20]
and reality,
and of their doctrines. Nevertheless we have learned thus much from
them: that not one of those who discuss principle or cause has
mentioned any other type than those which we we have distinguished in
the Physics.5 Clearly it is after these types that they are groping, however
uncertainly.Some
speak of the first principle as material, whether they regard it as
one or several, as corporeal or incorporeal: e.g. Plato speaks of the
"Great and Small"; the Italians6 of the Unlimited; Empedocles of Fire, Earth,
Water and Air; Anaxagoras of the infinity of homoeomeries.All these have apprehended this
type of cause; and all those too who make their first principle air or
water or "something denser than fire but rarer than air"7(for some have so
described the primary element). These, then, apprehended this cause
only, but others apprehended the source of
motion—e.g. all such as make Love and Strife, or
Mind, or Desire a first principle.As for the essence or
essential nature, nobody has definitely introduced
it;
1 Aristotle's objection is that it is unreasonable that a single operation of the formal upon the material principle should result in more than one product; i.e. that the material principle should be in itself duplicative.
2 Plato refers several times in the dialogues to an efficient cause (e.g. the Demiurgus,Plat. Soph. 265b-d, Plat. Tim. 28c ff.) and a final cause (e.g. Plat. Phil. 20d, 53e, Plat. Tim. 29d ff.); but Aristotle does not seem to take these allusions seriously.
3 Cf. Plat. Phil. 25e-26b.
5 Aristot. Phys. 2.3
6 See note on Aristot. Met. 5.15.
7 The various references in Aristotle to material principles intermediate between certain pairs of "elements" have been generally regarded as applying to Anaximander's ἄπειρον or Indeterminate; but the references are so vague (cf. Aristot. Met. 7.6, Aristot. Phys.187a 14, 189b 3, 203a 18) that it seems better to connect them with later and minor members of the Milesian school. Cf. Ross's note ad loc.
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989.
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