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[4]
Also Intelligence
apprehends the ultimates in both aspects—since ultimates as well as primary
definitions1
are grasped
by Intelligence and not reached by reasoning: in demonstrations, Intelligence apprehends
the immutable and primary definitions, in practical inferences,2 it apprehends the
ultimate and contingent fact, and the minor, premise, since these are the first principles
from which the end is inferred, as general rules are based on particular cases; hence we
must have perception of particulars, and this immediate perception is Intelligence.3
1 See 8.9.
2 The substantive to be understood may be προτάσεσι, ‘propositions’; but the reference seems to be not to the practical syllogism in the ordinary sense （see 7.3.9）, but to the establishment of ethical ἀρχαί by induction, which is the proper method of Ethics （1.4.5-7）. This induction is conceived as a syllogism （cf. Aristot. Pr. Anal. 2.23.）: Actions A, B, C . . . are desirable; Actions A, B, C . . .possess the quality Z; therefore all actions possessing the quality Z are desirable. Here both the major and the minor premise are sets of particular propositions intuitively seen to be true: νοῦς is τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα.
3 Here the intuitive element in Prudence, as well as in Wisdom （chaps. 5, 6.）, is termed Intelligence: at 8.9 it was called merely Prudence, in contrast with Intelligence, which was limited to intuition of the first principles of science. Here then νοῦς approximates to its popular sense （see 12.3, note）.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
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