Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
H. Rackham, Ed.

As a matter of fact, the feelings of self-regard described appear to be found in most people, even though they are of inferior moral worth. Perhaps men share them in so far as they have their own approval and believe in their own virtue; since the utterly worthless and criminal never possess them, or even have the appearance of doing so. [8] Indeed it may almost be said that no morally inferior persons possess them. For （d） such persons are at variance with themselves, desiring one thing and wishing another: this is the mark of the unrestrained, who choose what is pleasant but harmful instead of what they themselves think to be good. （a） Others again, out of cowardice and idleness, neglect to do what they think best for their own interests. And （b） men who have committed a number of crimes, and are hated for their wickedness, actually flee from life and make away with themselves. [9] Also （c） bad men constantly seek the society of others and shun their own company, because when they are by themselves they recall much that was unpleasant in the past and anticipate the same in the future, whereas with other people they can forget. Moreover they feel no affection for themselves, because they have no lovable qualities. Hence （e） such men do not enter into their own joys and sorrows, as there is civil war in their souls; one part of their nature, owing to depravity, is pained by abstinence from certain indulgences while another part is pleased by it; one part pulls them one way and another the other, as if dragging them asunder. [10] Or if it be impossible to feel pain and pleasure at the same time, at all events after indulging in pleasure they regret it a little later, and wish they had never acquired a taste for such indulgences; since the bad are always changing their minds.

Thus a bad man appears to be devoid even of affection for himself, because he has nothing lovable in his nature. If then such a state of mind is utterly miserable, we should do our utmost to shun wickedness and try to be virtuous. That is the way both to be friends with ourselves and to win the friendship of others. 5.

Goodwill appears to be an element of friendly feeling, but it is not the same thing as friendship; for it can be felt towards strangers, and it can be unknown to its object, whereas friendship cannot. But that has been discussed already.¹

Neither is goodwill the same as affection. For it has no intensity, nor does it include desire, but these things are necessarily involved in affection. [2] Also affection requires intimate acquaintance, where as goodwill may spring up all of a sudden, as happens for instance in regard to the competitors in a contest;