while Art and
Prudence are concerned only with things that admit of variation. Nor is Wisdom the
knowledge of first principles either1: for the philosopher has to arrive at some things by
demonstration.2
[2]
If then the qualities whereby we attain truth,3 and are never led into falsehood, whether
about things invariable or things variable, are scientific Knowledge, Prudence, Wisdom,
and Intelligence, and if the quality which enables us to apprehend first principles cannot
be any one among three of these, namely Scientific Knowledge, Prudence, and Wisdom, it
remains that first principles must be apprehended by Intelligence.4
7.
The term Wisdom is employed in the arts to denote those men who are the most perfect
masters of their art, for instance, it is applied to Pheidias as a sculptor and to
Polycleitus as a statuary. In this use then Wisdom merely signifies artistic excellence.
[2]
But we also think that some people are wise in general
and not in one department, not ‘wise in something else,’5
as Homer says in the Margites: “
Neither a delver nor a ploughman him
The Gods had made, nor wise in aught beside.
” Hence it is clear that Wisdom must be the most perfect of the modes of knowledge.
[3]
The wise man therefore must not only know the
conclusions that follow from his first principles, but also have a true conception of
those principles themselves. Hence Wisdom must be a combination of Intelligence and
Scientific Knowledge6: it must be a
consummated knowledge7
This text is part of:
Search the Perseus Catalog for:
View text chunked by:
- bekker page : bekker line
- book : chapter : section
Table of Contents:
1 i.e., not exclusively: see 7.3.
2 See 3.4, first note.
3 Cf. 3.1. Art is here omitted from the list.
4 νοῦς now receives its special sense （see 2.1, note） of a particular virtue of the intellect, viz. that faculty of rational intuition whereby it correctly apprehends （by process of induction, see 3.3） undemonstrable first principles. It is thus a part of σοφία （7.3,5）.
5 The sense rather requires ‘wise in some particular thing,’ but the expression is assimilated to the quotation.
6 See 6.1, 2.
7 Literally ‘knowledge having as it were a head,’ a phrase copied from Plato, Plat. Gorg. 505d.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
The Annenberg CPB/Project provided support for entering this text.
Purchase a copy of this text (not necessarily the same edition) from Amazon.com